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INTRODUCTION

The "culture war" has become a national moniker describing a variety
of policy debates between social conservatives and secular liberal
Americans. Hotly contested battlegrounds in this metaphorical war have
included abortion policy, affirmative action, the right to bear arms, and
gay marriage. Frequently these debates have divided secular Americans
from people of faith. Indeed, some commentators argue that the size of
the religious population, including especially members of the so-called
"Christian right," is the most vital difference between "red" and "blue"
states.'
Despite the colorful and polarizing salience of this depiction of the
country, profound facts strain the accuracy of the stereotypes it suggests.
For example, many secular people vigorously ascribe to the conservative
social agenda of right-leaning advocacy organizations such as the
Christian Coalition, the Family Research Council, and the Christian
Action Network. Moreover, many deeply sincere people of faith
wholeheartedly embrace the separation of church and state, abortion
rights, gun control, and other stereotypically secular positions. This
Article queries whether the public policy issues surrounding abusive
high-cost consumer lending may offer one more example that confounds
the assumptions behind the "culture war" label.
In the past fifteen to twenty years, America has witnessed a stunning
transformation in the consumer financial services offered to the lower
1. See, e.g., Alex Koppelman, How the Christian Right Could Defeat Rudy-and
Make Hillary President, SALON.COM, Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/

2007/10/19/Giuliani (discussing the impact of evangelical Christian voting habits on
electoral politics in the context of the 2008 presidential election, and noting "just how
important white evangelical voters have proved to the GOP's dominance in [the South,]
the region that is the source of its national strength").
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and lower-middle classes. A new breed of "fringe" creditors charging
prices well in excess of the old mafia loan-sharking syndicates has spread
throughout the country.2 The archetype of fringe creditors, commonly
referred to as "payday" lenders, charges average simple nominal annual
interest rates of about 450%.' These lenders have met a chorus of
criticism from the media, consumer advocates, military leaders, and
scholars. Critics argue that although payday loans have short initial
terms, they quickly become debt traps when unsuspecting or desperate
borrowers are unable to retire their rapidly swelling obligations.
Pointing to a seemingly endless supply of consumer horror stories,
payday lending critics label the loans "predatory" and have demanded
that the traditional American rules that once banned this industry be reimposed.5 Apologists for the industry counter that payday lenders are
merely responding to legitimate demand for financial services; therefore,
because consumers are not forced into their contracts, they can either
shop for a lower priced deal or elect not to borrow.6 At their core, these
arguments find their genesis in Jeremy Bentham's famous Defence of
Usury from 1787.'
While in recent years many sources have reconsidered Bentham's
economic arguments, far less discussed today are the moral and religious
arguments to which Bentham wrote his essay as a counterpoint. Indeed,
today's debate over payday loans is merely a reverberant echo of the
biblical usury debates that for at least a thousand years were arguably the
marquee intellectual struggle in Western commercial history. This
2. Simple nominal annual interest rates on extortionate mafia loan shark debts
averaged 250%. Syndicate Loan-Shark Activities and New York's Usury Statute, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 167,167 (1966).
3. U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP & CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., SHOW ME
THE MONEY! A SURVEY OF PAYDAY LENDERS AND REVIEW OF PAYDAY LENDER

LOBBYING IN STATE LEGISLATURES 9 tbl. (2000), available at http://www.uspirg.org/
uploads/OJ/JI/OJJIxjolTQllpsOOhaP -dg/showmethemoneyfinal.PDF; see also IND. DEP'T
OF FIN. INSTS., SUMMARY OF PAYDAY LENDER EXAMINATIONS 1 (1999), http://www.

in.gov/dfi/legal/paydaylend/Payday.PDF (reporting an average annual interest rate of
498.75% for more than 54,500 payday lending transactions conducted from July to
September 1999); URIAH KING, LESLIE PARRISH, & OZLEM TANIK, CTR. FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, FINANCIAL QUICKSAND:
PAYDAY LENDING SINKS
BORROWERS IN DEBT WITH $4.2 BILLION IN PREDATORY FEES EVERY YEAR 2 (2006),
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rrOl2-Financial-Quicksand-l106.pdf

("[P]ayday lenders across the nation routinely flip small cash advances into long-term,
high-cost loans with annual interest rates in the range of 400 percent.").
4. See infra notes 30, 32-33 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 39, 42-44 and accompanying text.
7. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, DEFENCE OF USURY (1787), reprinted in 3 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1-29 (John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell 1962) (1838-

1843).
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Article stands as a vestibule to that ancient edifice, inviting today's
scholars, advocates, financiers, regulators, political leaders, and clergy to
reacquaint themselves with the moral heritage of our crumbling usury
law.
Moreover, this Article attempts to ascertain whether the Christian
legacy of skepticism regarding high-interest-rate loans has translated into
consumer-protective regulation of today's payday lending industry.
Employing the tools of the interdisciplinary law and geography
movement, we explore the relationship between payday loan outlet
locations and the political power of conservative Christians in all fifty
states. Our study systematically surveys over 20,000 payday lender
locations, cast against a backdrop of Christian political power, local and
regional electoral districts, and a variety of demographic considerations.
We conclude, with a high degree of statistical certainty, that states with
powerful conservative Christian populations tend to host relatively
greater numbers of payday loan locations per capita as well as a greater
commercial density of payday lenders. These findings propound a tragic
and sad irony. Those states that have most ardently held to their pious
Christian traditions have tended to become more infested with the
progeny of money changers once expelled by Christ from the Hebrew
temple.8 Legislators in those states, who have effectively used biblical
principles to shape their legislative agenda on social and cultural issues,
have failed to consistently apply biblical principles to economic
legislation.
Although our Article engages broad, ancient, and highly controversial
issues, empirically, our study has only a modest goal. This Article reports
a new geographic fact: payday lenders are relatively numerous in the
Bible Belt and the Mormon Mountain West. That is, our data tell us
where payday lenders are; they do not tell us why these lenders are where
they are. Importantly, our data do not answer more difficult and
ambitious questions regarding the causal relationship between lending
practices and moral beliefs. The number of payday lenders in these and
other states is likely caused by a complex pattern of social, political, and
economic forces, including income, wealth, political affiliation, race,
immigrant status, health, insurance, education, familial relationships, and
others. Faith may or may not be one factor among others that created
the geographic pattern we report. But, our empirical database of payday
addresses will not answer this question. Of this large, complex puzzle,
this study adds one discreet but important piece: there are relatively
more payday lenders in Conservative Christian states. Part II of our
Article describes the payday lending industry, including its origins and its
8.

See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part III.C.1.
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products. This Part also introduces the biblical injunction against usury
and discusses the way in which the Bible has been interpreted, including
how the Bible gives rise to profound questions regarding the current
political response to payday lending. Part III introduces leading law and
geography theory and summarizes our empirical methodology. Part IV
juxtaposes our empirical description of payday lender locations and
conservative Christian political power with an analysis of state usury law.
This Part highlights states that stand out as interesting examples of the
current legal and geographic landscape. Part V then analyzes the results
of this study, ultimately drawing descriptive and prescriptive conclusions
for policy makers, including state and federal lawmakers, as well as
spiritual leaders and people of faith themselves. An appendix presenting
further state-specific results and methodological considerations follows.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Payday Lending Business Practices
Payday loans-which are also currently known as post-dated check
loans, deferred deposit loans, or cash advances-are high-interest-rate
loans with short initial durations. In most payday loans, the consumer
borrows money by writing a personal check to the lender for the loan
amount plus an additional fee.'
Usually, a payday lender asks its
borrower to write a check with a date one or two weeks in the future."
The date on the check represents the due date of the loan." Unlike
credit card companies, payday lenders generally do not check a loan
applicant's credit history. 3 Nor do payday lenders generally report the
borrower's repayment history to credit bureaus later on. 14 Instead,
payday lenders engage in minimal underwriting, usually only verifying an
applicant's identity and employment. 15 In a matter of minutes, a payday
9. Payday loans go by many other names, including deferred deposit transactions,
deferred presentment check cashing, delayed deposit check loans, and check advance
loans. See Jean Ann Fox, What Does It Take to Be a Loanshark in 1998? A Report on the
Payday Loan Industry, 772 PRACTISING L. INST. COM. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES 987, 989 (1998), available at 772 PLI/Comm 987 (Westlaw).
10. Id.
11. CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE FOR
THE HIGH-COST CREDIT MARKET 10 (2004); SHEILA BAIR, UNIV. OF MASS. AT
AMHERST ISENBERG SCH. OF MGMT., LOW-COST PAYDAY LOANS: OPPORTUNITIES

AND OBSTACLES 6 (2005), available at http://www.aecf.org/upload/PublicationFiles/
FEs3622H334.pdf (prepared for The Annie E. Casey Foundation).
12. PETERSON, supra note 11, at 10; see also Fox, supra note 9, at 990.
13. Fox, supra note 9, at 990.
14. See Richard R.W. Brooks, Essay, CreditPast Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994,1013
(2006).
15. See Fox, supra note 9, at 989.
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loan borrower can walk away with between one hundred and one
thousand dollars in cash.1 6 The best available estimates suggest that in the
current prototypical transaction, the borrower obtains a $325 loan with
an initial two-week duration in exchange for a finance charge of $52.17
When the borrower's two weeks are up, the lender is repaid by
depositing the borrower's check. 8 If the check clears, the transaction is
complete. The interest rate on this typical payday loan is approximately
450%."

Unfortunately, payday loan borrowers frequently are unable to pay off
their loans after the initial loan term. Many payday loan customers
borrow to address difficult financial situations such as medical problems,
job loss, and car troubles. Frequently, the very situation forcing the
debtor to borrow may prevent the debtor from repaying quickly.
Virtually every study or investigation that has explored the issue has
found that payday loan borrowers consistently fall into recurring debt
patterns, where unpaid loans compound for longer periods of time.2"
16. See KING, PARRISH & TANIK, supra note 3, at 19 tbl. (reporting average payday
loan amounts in twenty states ranging from $205 to $385, with a median of $325).
17. Id. at 8 tbl.3. Many lenders, including internet payday lenders, now obtain
consent to debit the borrower's back account with an ACH (automated clearinghouse)
transfer, rather than using a check. Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54
UCLA L. REV. 855, 861-62 & n.14 (2007); see also Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21
YALE J.ON REG. 121, 149 (2004).
18. Fox, supra note 9, at 990. Alternatively, the borrower can use cash to redeem the
check or may pay another fee to extend the loan. Id.

19. See supranote 3.
20. See, e.g., GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, GEORGETOWN
UNIV. MCDONOUGH SCH. OF BUS., PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA: AN
(2001), available at http://www.
business.gwu.edu/research/centers/fsrp/pdf/Mono35.pdf (showing that about forty percent
of borrowers rolled over more than five times in the preceding year, including about ten
percent of borrowers who renewed existing loans nine to thirteen times and another
ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER DEMAND 39 tbl. 5-11

ten percent who renewed fourteen times or more); ILL. DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS., SHORT
TERM LENDING: FINAL REPORT 26 (1999), available at http://www.idfpr.com/dfi/ccd/pdfs/
Shorterm.pdf (reporting that the average payday loan customer in Illinois borrows
thirteen times per year and remains a customer of the payday lender for a minimum of

six months); N.C.

OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF BANKS, REPORT TO THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY ON PAYDAY LENDING 5-6 & tbl.III(F) (2001), available at http://www.nccob.

org/NR/rdonlyres/2A95D7DA-75CO-49F3-B896CAC45D947727/0/CheckCashersReportto
GenAssembly.pdf (showing that approximately eighty-seven percent of borrowers of a
given payday lender use that lender's services more than once per year); LAURA E. UDIS,
UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, REPORT OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
REVISION COMMITTEE AND ACTIONS OF THE COLORADO COMMISSION ON CONSUMER

CREDIT 23-24 (1999) ("Some lenders continuously refinance deferred deposit loans and
collect more in refinance fees than the original loan amount, while the consumer continues
to owe the original loan.... Instances of as many as thirteen or more refinances have been
noted in compliance examinations."); U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP &
CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., supra note 3, at 8 ("[In 1999,] Indiana found an average of
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Even in states that have attempted to legally limit the duration of payday
loans, many borrowers fall into longer-term relationships with payday
lenders.21 Investigations by federal banking regulators and statements of
former payday lending employees confirm that payday lenders create
compensation incentives encouraging employees to manipulate
borrowers into long-term borrowing.22 Indeed, the best available

10.19 payday loans per year per customer, with the ten largest lenders averaging 12.05
loans per person per year."); WASH. STATE DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS., PAYDAY LENDING
REPORT: STATISTICS & TRENDS FOR 2003, at 3 tbls. (2005) (showing that over thirty
percent of borrowers borrow more than ten times per year, and almost ten percent borrow
twenty times or more per year); SHANNON CALLAHAN & ED MIERZWINSKI, OR.
STUDENT PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, PREYING ON PORTLANDERS 4 (2005),

http://www.ospirgstudents.org/uploads/8-/ym/8ym-aNozcskvET~qirBAg/preyingonportlan
ders.pdf (reporting that nearly three out of four payday loan borrowers cannot pay their
loans when they come due); IND. DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 3 (reporting that
on average, seventy-seven percent of payday loans are extensions of previously
existing contracts); IOWA CIVIC ANALYSIS NETWORK, UNIV. OF IOWA, PREDATORY
LENDING 3 (2006), http://www.uiowa.edu/-ican/Papers%202006/predatorylendingOlO27.
pdf (reporting an average of 13.8 loans per customer per year in Iowa); see also Paul
Chessin, Borrowing from Peter to Pay Paul: A Statistical Analysis of Colorado's Deferred
Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 387, 411 (2005) (noting that approximately sixtyfive percent of Colorado's payday loan volume is based on borrowers with more than
twelve payday loan terms per year); Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or
Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 55-77 (2002) (reviewing the phenomenon of
consumer debt rollover); Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A
Business Model that Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 19-25 (2003)
(examining the rollover problem in general and its specific manifestation on North
Carolina's payday loan industry).
21.

See VERITEC SOLUTIONS LLC, FLORIDA TRENDS IN DEFERRED PRESENTMENT

12 & tbl. (2005), http://www.veritecs.com/FL-trends-sep-2005.pdf (showing that the
average Florida payday lender customer borrows 7.9 times per year, and one out of four
borrows twelve or more times per year); VERITEC SOLUTIONS LLC, OKLAHOMA TRENDS
IN DEFERRED DEPOSIT LENDING 8 & tbl. (2005), http://www.veritecs.com/OK_trends_
11_2005.pdf (showing that the average Oklahoma payday lender customer borrows 9.4
times per year, and one out of four borrows thirteen times or more per year, accounting
for nearly sixty-two percent of all transactions).
22. U.S. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FACT SHEET: EAGLE
NATIONAL BANK CONSENT ORDER 2 (2002), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/eaglenbfact
%20sheet.pdf (reporting the discovery that a payday loan company offered employee
compensation incentives for promoting repeat borrowing); Mark Flannery & Katherine
Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the Price? 16-17 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin.
Research, Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
analytical/cfr/2005/wp2005/CFRWP_2005-09_FlannerySamolyk. pdf (explaining that high
frequency borrowers are more profitable because they generate lower loss ratios and
lower operating costs); see also Video: Payday Loans Trap Borrowers (Center for
Responsible Lending 2007), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/payday/
inside-the-payday-industry.html (interview with Rebecca Flippo, a former payday loan
store manager, who explains that she and her employees would downplay the high interest

rate to customers).
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nationwide estimate suggests that the average payday loan borrower
repays $793 for a $325 loan. 23
Payday loans of this sort have made the industry extremely profitable.
From the creditor's perspective, payday loan debts frequently perform
like a monthly annuity purchased with a relatively small initial
investment. 2' According to a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) study, forty-six percent of outstanding payday loans at a given
point of time were actually "rollovers" of older obligations 2 1 In addition,
payday loan collections offer many different fee generation
opportunities. Payday lenders generally supplement revenue from their
triple-digit interest rates with hefty late payment fees, insufficient funds
fees (for bounced checks), and attorney fees.26 Consumers who merely
pay interest and fees on their loans while making little headway on their
loan principals generate the vast majority of the payday lending
industry's profit. 27 By one estimate, approximately ninety percent of
payday lending industry revenue is based on "fees stripped from trapped
borrowers., 28 Because payday debt grows so quickly, lenders can still
make handsome profits even if they are forced to write off significant
amounts owed (though not necessarily advanced) under the terms
imposed in their contracts.29
Critics of the payday lending industry point to repetitive borrowing
patterns in asserting that the loans are actually debt traps that become
They frequently
inescapable for families with limited resources.
illustrate their points with the stories of individual borrowers who have
KING, PARRISH & TANIK, supra note 3, at 7, 8 tbl.3.
24. Cf.Mann & Hawkins, supra note 17, at 886, 897 (comparing payday lending to
credit card lending and noting that "the principal difference is that the payday lender need
invest only $200 to generate $60 per month, while the credit card issuer will need to invest
$3000").
25. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 22, at 12.
23.

26.

See U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP & CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., supra

note 3, at 6-7 (reporting that payday lenders frequently exceed state fee limits; charge
bounced check fees ranging from $7.50 to $40; and charge APRs ranging from 195% to
1092% on a two-week, one hundred dollar loan).
27.

KING, PARRISH & TANIK, supra note 3, at 6-7.

28.

Id. at 2, 6-7.

29.

See U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP & CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., supra

note 3, at 8 (reporting Tennessee's finding that its payday lenders "earned over 30%
return on investment in the first nine months of legal operation"); Mike Hudson, Going
for the Broke, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1993, at C1 ("In 1987, Entrepreneur magazine told its
readers they could open a check casher with an investment as small as $65,000 and pull in
before-tax profits as high as $117,000 a year. John Binder, a University of Illinois-Chicago
economist, studied Illinois check cashers and found they earn 10 to 20 times higher 'return
on equity' than banks."). But see Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 22, at 10 (positing that
"payday loans may not necessarily yield extraordinary profits" because advance fees are
comparable to operating costs).
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suffered from payday lending obligations." Other opponents of payday
lending often argue that the payday loan market is inefficient because of
information imperfections, cognitive distortions, and externalities.31
Some have compared the payday lending market to the market for illegal
narcotics: both products can destroy families and are, in some sense,
addictive.32 Other criticisms include the argument that payday loansirrespective of individual consumer wishes-create poverty by extracting
too much from low- and moderate-income families.3 Payday lenders are
generally recognized as among the most aggressive debt collectors in
American society, sometimes using public humiliation, threats, and
constant harassment to collect. 34 Some critics assert that payday lending
also harms other businesses by capturing disposable income that would
otherwise be paid to landlords, utility companies, professional service
providers, and other creditors.35 Still other critics complain that payday
lender storefront locations lower property values by generating poverty,
commercial ill-will, and possibly even attracting crime.36 Some have also
30. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, Seeking Quick Loans, Soldiers Race into HighInterest Traps, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2004, at Al (recounting the story of a Navy petty
officer who borrowed $500 at a 390% interest rate, which then spiraled into a chain of
loans with $4,000 outstanding at interest rates as high as 650%); Cheryl L. Reed, The
'Wild, Wild West' in Loans, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 15, 2004, at 20A (reporting that a single
mother of three borrowed $1,000 at a 521% interest rate to deal with a financial
emergency; unable to pay the loan back quickly, she found out that interest and fees on
her debt soon inflated the balance to $10,743).
31. E.g., PETERSON, supra note 11, at 128-36, 150-67, 199-241 (discussing economic
inefficiency in high cost consumer finance markets); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmakingand
the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending, 65 MD. L. REV. 70, 749-61
(2006) (discussing the problems of logistics, incomplete information, and financial
illiteracy as they relate to the recent phenomenon of overpriced home loans).
32. See PETERSON, supra note 11, at 173-75 (discussing the self-help group Debtors
Anonymous); J. Andrew Curliss, Lending Spurs Protest, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Apr. 12, 2002, at B1 (quoting North Carolina State Senator Wib Gulley as having
said that payday loans "'suck[] people into a cycle of escalating debt and
impoverishment'").
33. Cf KING, PARRISH & TANIK, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that American families
now pay $4.2 billion per year in predatory payday lending fees, and that states with a ban
on such lending save their citizens approximately $1.4 billion per year).
34. Johnson, supra note 20, at 77-78; see also Video: Payday Loans Trap Borrowers,
supra note 22 (describing the collection techniques used at one payday lending store).
35. See, e.g., RICK JURGENS, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., UTILITIES AND PAYDAY
LENDERS: CONVENIENT PAYMENTS, KILLER LOANS 26-28 (2007), available at http://

www.consumerlaw.org/reports/content/payday-utility.pdf (recognizing that payday loans
"jeopardize [consumers'] ability to pay for the necessities of life-including utility
services," and recommending that payday lenders who also collect utility bill payments be
prohibited "from promoting or soliciting lending services before, during or after the
transaction").
36. Annysa Johnson, Payday Loan Stores in Crosshairs,MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Sept. 21, 2006, at 6A; see also Heather MacDonald, Oakland Curbing Check Cashiers,
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complained that payday lenders clog the court system by bringing more
small claims court debt collection lawsuits than other businesses or
institutions.37 Payday lending may also tip consumers teetering on the
edge of insolvency into bankruptcy, thereby frustrating the collection
efforts of other creditors who otherwise might have been able to collect.38
The payday lending industry and its apologists respond to their critics
with the argument that repetitive indebtedness patterns are not evidence
of chain debts, but of satisfied, repeat customers. 39 They explain that the
transaction costs for small loans are comparable to those of larger loans,
necessitating higher prices. 0 Payday lenders remind critics that their
loans are collection-intensive and also require high fixed costs because
consumers demand close geographic proximity to lender locations.41
Many economists treat each individual debtor's choice to borrow as
conclusive
• 41 evidence that such decisions produce the greatest social utility
possible. Some have argued that payday loans are necessary to help
consumers bridge personal and communal tragedies. 43 But most of all,
payday lenders and their apologists argue that regulation of payday
lending is ardently paternalistic." If a competent adult wants to pay
triple-digit interest rates, he or she should not be hindered from doing so.
Most of these arguments echo those found in Jeremy Bentham's
eighteenth century letter Mischiefs of the Anti- Usurious Laws.45
The competing perspectives of the payday lending industry and its
critics have created an incendiary national debate over usury law and
consumer protection regulations. Recently, a payday lending industry
OAKLAND TRIB., Oct. 6, 2004, at 1 ("[C]heck-cashing facilities . . . [are] booming

businesses [that] prey on the poor and inhibit economic development.").
37.

Cy Ryan, Governor Signs into Law Payday Loan Bill, 27 More, LAS VEGAS SUN,

June 15, 2005, at 4B (reporting that 67,000 lawsuits had been brought by payday lenders
against consumers in Clark County, Nevada).
38. See Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause
Bankruptcy? 21 (Feb. 19, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.law.
("We
vanderbilt.edu/faculty/faculty-personal-sites/paige-skiba/download.aspx?id=2221)
find that payday loan applicants approved for their first loans file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy significantly more often than rejected first-time applicants."). But see Mann &
Hawkins, supra note 17, at 885-86 ("Although there must be some transactions in which
the additional funds available from a payday lender tip the scale toward insolvency, these
small loans probably do not contribute substantially to financial distress and insolvency.").
39. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 17, at 885.
40. Id. at 857, 889.
41. Id. at 863, 865.
42. See, e.g., id. at 885.
43. E.g., Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villains? 7, 9 (Dec. 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2007/apr/
CFRSS_2007_Morse.pdf).
44.

Johnson, supra note 20, at 72.

45.

See generally BENTHAM, supra note 7, at 9-11 (Letter VI).
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trade association raised the stakes in this debate by kicking off a multimillion dollar advertising and public relations blitz to squelch rising
criticism of the social fallout from their financial products.46 For their
part, critics of the payday lending industry have recently found a new and
formidable ally in the U.S. Department of Defense. In recent years, the
Pentagon has come to the conclusion that military service members were
encountering significant financial, personal, and even military problems
as a result of payday lending. 47 Responding to the irony of predatory
lending to military personnel in a time of war, 8 Congress recently passed
legislation which attempts to prevent payday lending to military service
members by limiting permissible interest rates on loans to service
members to no more than thirty-six percent per year.41
While it is difficult to make generalizations about the American public,
as a society we have tended to be conflicted regarding the important
public policy issues that surround payday lending. On the one hand,
most Americans are naturally skeptical of government regulation of open
markets. On the other hand, very few Americans doubt the wisdom of
banning, or at least aggressively regulating, public commerce in some
especially dangerous products such as recreational narcotics, child
pornography, and weapons-grade plutonium. Moreover, safety measures
such as seat belt laws and automobile air bag regulations find wide
approval not only for the safety of the individual, but also because of the
external costs passed on to government and the public by violators. It
should not be unexpected that many will turn to their core moral and
philosophical beliefs in mediating between these divisive perspectives.
46. Stuart Elliott, Critics of Lending Practices Adopt a Harder Edge, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2007, at C6; Sue Kirchhoff, Payday Lenders Craft User Protections, USA TODAY,
Feb. 22, 2007, at IB; Susanne M. Schafer, Payday Loan Industry Acts to Quell Criticism,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2007, at C8.
47. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES
DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 4-6 (2006),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Report-to-Congress-final.pdf.
48. See A Review of the Department of Defense's Report on Predatory Lending
PracticesDirected at Members of the Armed Forces and Their Dependents: Hearing Before
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and UrbanAffairs of the United States Senate,

109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Hearing on Predatory Lending Practices] (written
testimony of Christopher Peterson, Associate Professor, University of Florida, at 1,
http://banking.senate.gov/public/ files/ACF7541.pdf); Financial Services Needs of Military
Personnel and Their Families: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and

Investigations of the H. Comm. on FinancialServices, 109th Cong. 7 (2006) (statement of
Rep. Maxine Waters, Member, H. Comm. on Financial Services).
49. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L.
No. 109-364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (codified at 10 U.S.C.A. § 987(b) (West Supp.
2007)) ("A creditor... may not impose an annual percentage rate of interest greater than
36 percent with respect to the consumer credit extended to a covered service member or a
dependent of a covered service member.").
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Because a large majority of the United States population is Christian, we
should expect that the moral dictates of this religious perspective will
play an important role in determining the future political and legal
response to payday lending.
B. Usury Law and the ChristianTheological Tradition
Payday lending is new to neither world history nor the Christian
tradition. Loans functionally similar to payday loans existed in Biblical
times. There are extensive historical records of high cost, abusive loans
throughout ancient Mesopotamia. Loan contracts and receipts were
commonly recorded in cuneiform on clay tablets. Payday lenders in the
ancient world frequently used the lunar cycle as a tool in establishing
short-term loan due dates. Impoverished debtors were said to fear the
coming of the new moon, when small-value, high-cost loans came due.51
Indeed, apparently recognizing the harmful social side effects of loans
similar to today's payday loans, many religious and government
institutions in the ancient world strictly regulated loan pricing. For
example, the Babylonian Empire legally limited interest rates to thirtythree percent per annum on loans payable in grain, and twenty percent
per annum on loans payable in silver. Similarly, the Roman Empire
experimented with several different interest
rate caps, eventually settling
2
on a twelve percent per annum limit.1
Against this historical backdrop, there can be little doubt that the
Bible strongly condemns usurious lending. At least a dozen biblical
passages suggest that usurious lending, especially to the poor, is a grave
sin. For example, the first reference to usury in the Bible states: "If thou
lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee, thou shalt not be to
him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury."53 The Book of

50. Our discussion of biblical and Christian theological perspectives on payday
lending should not be read as an endorsement of one religious perspective over another.
In a democratic society, all religious perspectives are entitled to consideration and respect.
This Article focuses on the Christian tradition because of the demographic, geographic,
and political importance of that perspective in influencing the American political process.
51. See Andrew Simmonds, Amah and Eyed and the Origin of Legal Rights, 46 S.D.
L. REV. 516, 537 n.348 (2001).
52. Donna M. Kish-Goodling, Using The Merchant of Venice in Teaching Monetary
Economics, 29 J. ECON. EDUC. 330, 332 (1998).
53. Exodus 22:25. Leviticus includes a comparable passage:
And if thy brother be waxen poor, and fallen in decay with thee; then thou shalt
relieve him: yea, though he be a stranger, or a sojourner; that he may live with
thee. Take thou no usury of him, or increase: but fear thy God; that thy brother
may live with thee. Thou shalt not give him they money upon usury, nor lend him
thy victuals for increase.
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Ezekiel suggests that usurious lending is a sin comparable to extortion
and murdering in exchange for money, ' and warns that grave
punishment - hellfire - awaits usurers:

As they gather silver, and brass, and iron, and lead, and tin, into
the midst of the furnace, to blow the fire upon it, to melt it; so
will I gather you in mine anger and in my fury, and I will leave
you there, and melt you. Yea, I will gather you, and blow upon
you in the fire of my wrath, and ye shall be melted in the midst
thereof. As silver is melted in the midst of the furnace, so shall
ye be melted in the midst thereof; and ye shall know that I the
LORD have poured out my fury upon you.

Leviticus 25:35-37; see also Psalms 15:1, 5 ("Lord, who shall abide in thy tabernacle? who
shall dwell in thy holy hill? ... He that putteth not out his money to usury, nor taketh
reward against the innocent. He that doeth these things shall never be moved.").
54. The passage states:
In thee have they taken gifts to shed blood; thou hast taken usury and increase,
and thou hast greedily gained of thy neighbors by extortion, and hast forgotten
me, saith the Lord GOD. Behold, therefore I have smitten mine hand at thy
dishonest gain which thou hast made, and at thy blood which hath been in the
midst of thee. Can thine heart endure, or can thine hands be strong, in the days
that I shall deal with thee? I the LORD have spoken it, and will do it. And I will
scatter thee among the heathen, and disperse thee in the countries, and will
consume thy filthiness out of thee. And thou shalt take thine inheritance in
thyself in the sight of the heathen, and thou shalt know that I am the LORD.
Ezekiel 22:12-16.
55. Id. at 22:20-22. In a similar passage, usury and oppression of the poor are
included in a list of sins that prevent redemption:
He that hath not given forth upon usury, neither hath taken any increase, that
hath withdrawn his hand from iniquity, hath executed true judgment between
man and man, Hath walked in my statutes, and hath kept my judgments, to deal
truly; he is just, he shall surely live, saith the Lord GOD. If he beget a son that is
a robber, a shedder of blood, and that doeth the like to any one of these things,
And that doeth not any of those duties, but even hath eaten upon the mountains,
and defiled his neighbour's wife, Hath oppressed the poor and needy, hath
spoiled by violence, hath not restored the pledge, and hath lifted up his eyes to
the idols, hath committed abomination, Hath given forth upon usury, and hath
taken increase: shall he then live? he shall not live: he hath done all these
abominations; he shall surely die; his blood shall be upon him. Now, lo, if he
beget a son, that seeth all his father's sins which he hath done, and considereth,
and doeth not such like, That hath not eaten upon the mountains, neither hath
lifted up his eyes to the idols of the house of Israel, hath not defiled his
neighbour's wife, Neither hath oppressed any, hath not withholden the pledge,
neither hath spoiled by violence, but hath given his bread to the hungry, and hath
covered the naked with a garment, That hath taken off his hand from the poor,
that hath not received usury nor increase, hath executed my judgments, hath
walked in my statutes; he shall not die for the iniquity of his father, he shall surely
live.
Id. at 18:8-17; see also Jeremiah15:10 (hinting at punishment awaiting usurers).
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Similarly, Nehemiah rebuked his fellow Israelites for tolerating
56
predatory lending within their community. Proverbs even suggests that
the prayers of usurers are an abomination. 7 New Testament passages in
both Luke and Matthew emphasize charity, suggesting that one should
not seek profit when lending to those in need. 8 And, Jesus's only
recorded act of violence echoes the Old Testament's vitriol on the
subject of ill-gotten profit. While the Bible is ambiguous on this point, as
a historical matter, it is likely that the money changers that Jesus
whipped and expelled from the Hebrew temple made usurious loans. 9
Collectively, biblical injunctions against usurious lending are at the core
of the moral tradition that formed a foundation for modern American
cultural attitudes toward debt.6
Moreover, the biblical condemnation of usurious lenders is closely
related to the deep and consistent message of the Bible demanding kind
and just treatment of poor and vulnerable members of society. 6 For
56. Nehemiah 5:1-13.
57. Proverbs 28:6, 8-9 ("Better is the poor that walketh in his uprightness, than he
that is perverse in his ways, though he be rich. . . . He that by usury and unjust gain
increaseth his substance, he shall gather it for him that will pity the poor. He that turneth
away his ear from hearing the law, even his prayer shall be abomination.").
58. As Luke states, quoting Jesus during the Sermon on the Mount:
And if ye do good to them which do good to you, what thank have ye? for sinners
also do even the same. And if ye lend to them of whom ye hope to receive, what
thank have ye? for sinners also lend to sinners, to receive as much again. But love
ye your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing again; and your
reward shall be great, and ye shall be the children of the Highest: for he is kind
unto the unthankful and to the evil.
Luke 6:33-35; see also Matthew 5:42 ("Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that
would borrow of thee turn not thou away.").
59. See John 2:13-16. Throughout the ancient Mediterranean, exchanging currency
and lending money were closely linked. It is likely that some or most of the money
changers operating at temples throughout the ancient Mediterranean also loaned money
in addition to exchanging currency. See EDWARD E. COHEN, ATHENIAN ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY 7 (1992); HENRI DANIEL-ROPS, DAILY LIFE IN THE TIME OF JESUS 251-52
(Patrick O'Brian trans., Hawthorn Books 1962) (1961); JAMES WILLIAM GILBART, THE
HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF BANKING 2-4 (3d ed. 1837); BERNARD LEWIS, THE

MIDDLE EAST 172-73 (1995); Scorr B. MACDONALD & ALBERT L. GASTMANN, A
HISTORY OF CREDIT & POWER IN THE WESTERN WORLD 25 (2001); PAUL MILLS,
JUBILEE CTR., INTEREST IN INTEREST: THE OLD TESTAMENT BAN ON INTEREST AND

ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY 7 n.8 (1989), available at http://www.jubilee-centre.org/

pdfs/Interest%20in%20lnterest.pdf; Christopher Howgego, The Supply and Use of Money
in the Roman World 200 B.C. to A.D. 300,82 J.ROMAN STUD. 1, 14 (1992).
60. Paul B. Rasor, Biblical Roots of Modern Consumer Credit Law, 10 J.L. &
RELIGION 157, 192 (1993-1994).
61. See Richard H. Hiers, Biblical Social Welfare Legislation: Protected Classes and
Provisions for Persons in Need, 17 J.L. & RELIGION 49, 49-57 (2002) ("[B]iblical law is
distinctive in its consistent regard for the welfare of 'the poor' and otherwise vulnerable or
needy members of society.").
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example, Deuteronomy demands "[t]hou shalt not oppress an hired
servant that is poor and needy, whether he be of thy brethren, or of thy
strangers that are in thy land within thy gates."6 2 The Bible appears to
demand special protection for society's most vulnerable members,
commanding Christians to "[e]xecute true judgment, and shew mercy
and compassions every man to his brother: And oppress not the widow,
nor the fatherless, the stranger, nor the poor." 63 Furthermore, Jesus
expressed profound skepticism of "them that trust in riches," explaining
that "[i]t is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for
a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God." 4 Moreover, Christ's
Golden Rule would appear to place triple-digit interest rate loans in a
jaundiced light: presumably usurious lenders ought not make abusive
loans to others, because they themselves would prefer not to borrow on
such terms. 61 Indeed Jesus's exposition of the Golden Rule in the Gospel
66
of Luke precedes an exhortation to lend without expectation of reward.
In the long centuries of evolving Christian theology following biblical
times, the controversy regarding the biblical position on usury has
focused on whether charging any interest at all is permissible. Some Old
Testament passages appear to take the position that for Hebrew tribal
members it was permissible to make interest-bearing loans to foreigners,
but not to fellow Jews. 6' Early Christians interpreted these passages as
having changed in the wake of Christ's ministry. They believed that after
Christ, the law permitting interest-bearing loans to foreigners no longer
applied because the New Testament notion of universal charity and
62. Deuteronomy 24:14.
Second Samuel provides a parable emphasizing the
important of kind treatment of the poor:
And the LORD sent Nathan unto David. And he came unto him, and said unto
him, There were two men in one city; the one rich, and the other poor. The rich
man had exceeding many flocks and herds: But the poor man had nothing, save
one little ewe lamb, which he had bought and nourished up: and it grew up
together with him, and with his children; it did eat of his own meat, and drank of
his own cup, and lay in his bosom, and was unto him as a daughter. And there
came a traveller unto the rich man, and he spared to take of his own flock and of
his own herd, to dress for the wayfaring man that was come unto him; but took
the poor man's lamb, and dressed it for the man that was come to him. And
David's anger was greatly kindled against the man; and he said to Nathan, As the
LORD liveth, the man that hath done this thing shall surely die: And he shall
restore the lamb fourfold, because he did this thing, and because he had no pity.
2 Samuel 12:1-6.
63. Zechariah 7:9-10.
64. Mark 10:24-25.
65. See Matthew 7:12 ("Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do
to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets."); see also Luke 6:31.
66. Luke 6:31-36.
67. See Deuteronomy 23:19-20; Nehemiah 5:7-8; see also BENJAMIN NELSON, THE
IDEA OF USURY 29 (2d ed. 1969).
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brotherhood rendered the Old Testament injunction against interest
applicable to all humanity. 6 For them, after Christ there were no
"foreigners" as such. Thus, throughout the medieval era, both Papal and
61
civil authorities banned all interest-bearing loans.
During the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation, both
Catholic and Protestant religious leaders began to question the
prohibition of all interest. Instead, these leaders and theologians took
the position that the Bible forbids only excessive interest. For example,
John Calvin argued that ambiguity in the translation of the Bible led
early Christians into a misinterpretation of God's moral vision.7 ° Calvin
pointed out that the Old Testament uses two different Hebrew words
that have given translators trouble: neshek and tarbit.7a Neshek is used
more frequently and appears by itself in some biblical passages, such as
the Bible's first mention of usury in Exodus. 7' The Hebrew word neshek
shares an entomological root with the Hebrew verb "to bite., 73 Focusing
on this word, Calvin argued that the Bible only prohibited "biting"-or
Moreover, Calvin and other early Protestants
exorbitant-interest.
argued that the Parable of the Ten Talents suggested that loans with
modest interest rates, especially for commercial purposes, were
permitted.75 In this New Testament parable, a Master criticizes a servant
for failing to invest funds entrusted to him.76 Like Calvin, Martin Luther
68. MILLS, supra note 59, at 9 (noting that Jerome, a leader of the early church,
"contended that the prohibition of interest in Deuteronomy had been univeralised [sic] by
the Prophets and the New Testament since Christians are to treat everyone as a
'brother."'); see also NELSON, supra note 67, at 29.
69. See NELSON, supra note 67, at 29.
70. See Joshua Buch, Neshekh and Tarbit: Usury from Bible to Modern Finance, 33
JEWISH BIBLE Q. 13, 17-18 (2005); see also ERIC KERRIDGE, USURY, INTEREST AND THE

REFORMATION 25-27 (2002).
71. Buch, supra note 70, at 17.
72. Id. at 14-16 (reciting Old Testament passages and distinguishing between the use
of neshekh and tarbit).
73. Id. at 13-14.
74. Speaking of the passage from Ezekiel at chapter 18, verses 7-8, Calvin explained:
"Here, among other crimes, Ezekiel numbers foenus. The word usury is not properly apt
in this passage. Neshek is derived from the word for biting and is the name the Hebrews
give to fenory, because it gnaws away and progressively devours wretched men."
KERRIDGE, supra note 70, at 25 (translating JOHN CALVIN, PRAELECTIONES IN LIBRUM
PROPHETIARUM JEREMIAE ET LAMENTATIONES NECNON IN EZECHIELIS PROPHETA

VIGINTI CAPITA PRIORA 169 (Amsterdam, 1567)); see also NELSON, supra note 67, at 75 &

n.5; Buch, supra note 70, at 17; supra note 55.
75. See KERRIDGE, supra note 70, at 94-95 (translating JOHN CALVIN, EPISTOLAE ET
RESPONSA 355-57 (Geneva, 1575)); see also J.E. Hartley, Debt, in 1 THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BIBLE ENCYCLOPEDIA 905, 906 (Geoffrey W. Bromiley et
al. eds., rev. ed. 1979).
76. Matthew 25:14-30.
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believed that some commercial transactions with prices comparable to
interest rates of between five and six percent per annum were biblically
justified."7 Similarly, in the Catholic tradition, as early as 1461 Pope Paul
II gave his tacit approval to church-sponsored charitable pawnshops to
charge a six percent simple nominal annual interest rate. 8
But even in the comparatively relaxed usury theology following the
Reformation, high-cost lending continued to be viewed as a grievous sin.
For example, while Calvin believed that God permitted modest interest
rates, he had nothing but contempt for those who made excessively
priced loans to the impoverished, calling them "beyond doubt mean and
money-grubbing," and suggesting that "an ockerer will always be a
brigand, . . . and in his wickedness will go on the prowl, just as if there
were no laws, no fairness, in short, no brotherly love among men.""
Moreover, Calvin would likely not have been impressed with
contemporary justifications of payday lending that rely on new financial
terminology or changing technology. To similar arguments made in his
day, Calvin responded that "[w]e know the name of usurer has been
everywhere and in all times detested and disreputable ... For crafty men
are forever inventing some little subterfuge or other to deceive God
with." ' For his part, Luther argued that "[a] manifest usurer one should
excommunicate, that is, one should not give him the sacrament.""' And if
a high-cost consumer lender were to attempt to repent, Luther argued
that to do so, "he must become a Zaccheus, give back in full what he has
stolen to whom he skinned it off.""
John Wesley, the theologian perhaps most influential on conservative
Christian Americans, held a view of usury similar to Calvin's and
Luther's.83 Wesley believed Christians should be wise stewards of their
77.

SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 77 (4th

ed. 2005). Referring to Zinskauf, annual rent charges accompanying the sale of land
comparable to a contemporary mortgage, Luther explained, "I readily allow what the law
and emperor allow: 5 or 6 in the hundred. But 20, 30, 40 that is overmuch." KERRIDGE,
supra note 70, at 41 (translating MARTIN LUTHER, TISCHREDEN, reprintedin 8 LUTHERS
WERKE IN AUSWAHL 241 (0. Clemen ed., 1930-1935)).
78.

HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 77, at 76.

79. KERRIDGE, supra note 70, at 111 (translating CALVIN, supra note 74, at 170); see
also id. at 35 ("We should be deluding ourselves if we for one moment imagined that
Calvin regarded ocker (usury in the narrow and common sense) with anything but the
utmost loathing.").
80. Id. at 49 (translating JOHN CALVIN, COMMENTARI IN LIBROS MOSIS 527)
(second alteration in original).
81. Id. at 38 (translating LUTHER, supra note 77, at 276-77).
82. Id. (translating LUTHER, supra note 77, at 276-77).
83. DONALD W. DAYTON, THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF PENTECOSTALISM 88-89
(1987). See generally MANFRED MARQUARDT, JOHN WESLEY'S SOCIAL ETHICS (John E.

Steeley & W. Stephen Gunter trans., 1992); RONALD H. STONE, JOHN WESLEY'S LIFE &
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material wealth-avoiding and, wherever possible, responsibly repaying
debts.s' But, Wesley also counseled against forming hasty judgment of
those unable to repay debts because "[tihere may be secrets in the
situation of a person which few but God are acquainted with."8 Wesley
was less circumspect on usurious lending than he was of necessitous
borrowing. He taught that one could not experience a true Christian
transformation or conversion while continuing to make a living through
high-cost lending. 6 Indeed, like Calvin and Luther, Wesley was grimly
dubious of the prospects for usurers in the afterlife-preaching on this

point that nothing "can [be] gain[ed] by swallowing up his neighbour's

substance, without gaining the damnation of hell.""7
In comparison to Europe, the religious history of the United States is
generally viewed as complex. For example, Alexis de Tocqueville noted
that the constitutional protection of the free exercise of religion and
relatively permissive concept of religious tolerance-at least toward
Christians- allowed many different faiths and sects to flower in early
American history. 88 A complete catalogue of these faiths and their views
on personal finance and abusive lending is beyond the scope of this
Article. Still, we are aware of no new theological source, theory, or
insight that has changed the basic Reformation interpretation of the
biblical passages condemning usury.89 In fact, to our knowledge no
ETHICS (2001); Richard P. Heitzenrater, John Wesley, in HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF
METHODISM 225, 225-27 (Charles Yrigoyen, Jr. & Susan E. Warrick eds., 1996) (providing
a biography of John Wesley). Jennifer Butler goes even further suggesting that it was
Wesley's evangelical revivalism and commitment to overseas proselytizing that helped
shape and guide the development of Great Britain's empire. JENNIFER S. BUTLER, BORN
AGAIN 6 (2006).
84. See John Wesley, Sermon 50: The Use of Money, in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN
WESLEY: SERMONS 1134-70, at 266, 266-67 (Albert C. Outler ed., 1985).
85. John Wesley, Sermon 131: The Danger of Increasing Riches, in 4 THE WORKS OF
JOHN WESLEY: SERMONS IV 115-151, at 178, 179 (Albert C. Outler ed., 1987).
86. Wesley believed, as do many Americans that salvation-being saved-begins as
an action taken in the present rather than in the afterlife. DAYTON, supra note 83, at 4547. In his view, usurious lending prevented one from having a truly Christian
transformative experience. See WESLEY, supra note 84, at 270-71.
87. WESLEY, supra note 84, at 271. "We cannot devour the increase of [a neighbor's]
lands, and perhaps the lands and houses themselves, by gaming, by overgrown bills.., or
by requiring or taking such interest as even the laws of our country forbid. Hereby all
pawnbroking is excluded, seeing whatever good we might do thereby all unprejudiced men
see with grief to be abundantly overbalanced by the evil." Id. at 270-71.
88.

See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 278 (Harvey C.

Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press, 2000) (1992) ("There is an
innumerable multitude of sects in the United States.").
89. A small minority of theologians continue to maintain the Medieval view of
interest-bearing loans. See, e.g., MILLS, supra note 59, at 36-42 (describing the features of
the Medieval system of interest-free loans and the workability of such a system in the
modern era).
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Christian theologian, pastor, or priest has ever maintained that the Bible
permits exorbitantly priced consumer loans. Indeed, if the biblical
injunction against usury, or neshekh, is to have any meaning at all in
today's society, then making payday loans to impoverished borrowers at
a three hundred percent interest rate must surely be a sin. 9°
Herein lies the puzzle driving this Article: if the Bible so clearly and
forcefully condemns usury, one would hypothesize that political
jurisdictions with a traditional, conservative Christian perspective would
adopt laws reflecting this biblical value. The views of conservative
Christian Americans on usurious lending are important not only
sociologically, but also in predicting the future political and legal
response to recent explosive growth in payday lending and other forms of
high-cost consumer credit targeting low- and moderate-income
Americans. As a group, conservative Christians are one of (if not the)
most influential demographic interest groups in American society. The
Christian theology of usury is an indispensable backdrop in
understanding the contentious national debate over payday lending. As
powerful money lenders and consumer rights organizations battle over
payday lending regulation, what role will those who endorse biblical
values play?
II. METHODOLOGY
Interdisciplinary legal and geographic scholarship explores the
relationship between law and space. It shows how law and legal
institutions can manifest themselves in traceable ways across locations
and boundaries. Although legal rules are a product of human thought
and communication, they are designed to control and influence events in
the physical world. Jurists, legislators, and administrators all perceive the
physical world and craft their policies in relation to it. Thus, "law and
geography" scholarship uses geographic tools to understand the
consequences of legal policies and institutions." And in turn, it explores
the "inertia of space"-that is, how space shapes the process and
substance of law. 92 Law and geography scholars have produced
90. See Exodus 22:25 ("If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee,
thou shalt not be to him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury."); see also
Matthew 6:24 ("No one can serve two masters. Either he will hate the one and love the
other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve both God
and Money.").
91. See Nicholas K. Blomley & Joel C. Bakan, Spacing Out: Towards a Critical
Geography of Law, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 661, 662-64 (1992).

92. Id. at 664. There is, of course, far too much useful law and geography scholarship
to list here. For a short introduction to the still emerging field, see generally id.; David
Delaney, Richard T. Ford & Nicholas Blomley, Preface to THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES
READER, at xiii (Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney & Richard T. Ford eds., 2001); Jane

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 57:637

influential scholarship addressing legal issues in a variety of topical areas
including race relations, homelessness, health care, gender, crime, and
the environment. 9
Interdisciplinary law and geography analysis has also produced
influential scholarship on consumer financial services. Several authors
have used geographic analyses of home mortgage lending patterns to
demonstrate racial bias in the approval of credit applications.94
Geographic analysis helped convince Congress that in some communities
banks accepted deposits but did not give out an equivalent amount in
loans-a process sometimes called "disinvestment."' 95 Accordingly,
Congress adopted the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which
requires that depository institutions make efforts to lend in low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods within the contiguous geographic area

Holder & Carolyn Harrison, Connecting Law and Geography, in 5 LAW AND
GEOGRAPHY 3 (Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison eds., 2003).
93. E.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171-72 (1996)
(arguing for street-by-street variation in panhandling ordinances); Richard Thompson
Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and Racial Segregation, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1997) (contrasting the legal treatment of electoral districts with
that of local government boundaries); Robert J.Goldstein, Putting Environmental Law on
the Map: A Spatial Approach to Environmental Law Using GIS, in LAW AND
GEOGRAPHY, supra note 92, at 523, 535-37 (arguing for the use of mapping technology to
measure success of environmental laws); Tom Koch & Ken Denike, Geography: The
Problem of Scale, and Process or Allocation: The US National Organ Transplant Act of
1986, Amended 1990, in LAW AND GEOGRAPHY, supra note 92, at 109, 122-23, 127-29
(reporting that geographic analysis of the Organ Transplant Act showed pockets of
inadequate organ distribution and missed opportunities for organ harvesting in rural areas
and among ethnic minorities); Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107,
1178-93 (2000) (conducting spatial analysis of drug arrests along the northern coast of
California's San Diego County); Carol Sanger, Essay, Girls and the Getaway: Cars,
Culture, and the Predicament of Gendered Space, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 705, 709 (1995)
(arguing that post-automobile suburban geographic patterns and zoning ordinances have
helped rigidify gender roles by creating "the chauffeur-mother, now tethered less to the
hearth than to the garage").
94. Joe T. Darden, Lending Practices and Policies Affecting the American
Metropolitan System, in THE AMERICAN METROPOLITAN SYSTEM 93, 93-94 (Stanley D.
Brunn & James 0. Wheeler eds., 1980); Steven R. Holloway, Exploring the Neighborhood
Contingency of Race Discriminationin Mortgage Lending in Columbus, Ohio, 88 ANNALS
AsS'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 252, 252-53 (1998); Michael Reibel, Geographic Variation in
Mortgage Discrimination: Evidence from Los Angeles, 21 URB. GEOGRAPHY 45, 45-46
(2000).
95. Community Credit Needs: Hearings on S. 406 Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 17-18 (1977) (statement of Ralph Nader, Center
for the Study of Responsive Law); Robert G. Boehmer, Mortgage Discrimination:
Paperwork and Prohibitions Prove Insufficient-Is it Time for Simplification and
Incentives?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 622 & nn.156-57 (1993).
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surrounding their office or group of offices. 96 With respect to payday
lending in particular, previous geographic evidence suggests that these
lenders disproportionately locate their branches in poor and minority
neighborhoods9 Moreover, geographic evidence suggesting that payday
lenders cluster around military bases, in order to target service members,
was influential in persuading Congress to adopt a federal usury law and
arbitration ban in some loans to military personnel. 98
A. Locating the American Payday Lending Industry

To better understand the relationship between payday lending, usury
law, and the Christian faith of many Americans, this Article explores the
spatial location patterns of payday lenders and the political power of
conservative Christians. To that end, we have attempted to compile a list
of every payday lender location in the United States. Construction of
our database was simplified in that eleven states have usury laws
effectively prohibiting payday lending within their borders. 99 With the
exception of a few states, the addresses of payday lenders were available
either via mail or online from each state's regulatory authority.
Telephone directories were used to gather address data for the remaining
states that either had no regulatory authority or otherwise did not make
addresses of regulated payday lenders publicly available. Moreover, in
addition to mapping payday lenders, we also mapped every brick-andmortar FDIC-insured bank branch in the nation.Y° Mapping banks
96. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, § 804, 91 Stat. 1111,
1148 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1) (2000)). Under the CRA, banking
regulators are required to conduct periodic legal and geographic analyses of depository
institutions, and may potentially deny permission to institutions receiving poor evaluations
to merge or open new branches. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291,300 (1993).
97. Steven M. Graves, Landscapes of Predation,Landscapes of Neglect: A Location
Analysis of Payday Lenders and Banks, 55 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 303, 312 (2003).
98. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L.
No. 109-364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (codified at 10 U.S.C.A. § 987(b), (e)(3) (West
Supp. 2007)); Hearing on PredatoryLending Practices,supra note 48 (written testimony of
Christopher Peterson, Associate Professor, University of Florida, at 8, http://banking.
senate.gov/public/_files/ACF7541.pdf); Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson,
Predatory Lending and the Military: The Law and Geography of "Payday" Loans in
Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 657-58 (2005); see also supra notes 47-49 and
accompanying text.
99. KING, PARRISH &TANIK, supra note 3, at 5.
100. Mapping bank branches is much more simple than mapping payday lenders
because the FDIC maintains a list of the location of every FDIC-insured bank. See
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Find an Institution, http://www2.fdic.gov/
idasp/frmjinst.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2008). The FDIC recognizes several categories of
banks; for our purposes, we removed from our databases impermanent and limited
purposes branches.
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allowed us to compare the spatial pattern and density of an industry
closely related to payday lending. The map of banks provided a control
group and a barometer of commercial activity at each spatial scale
studied.
Next, the addresses of over 24,000 payday lenders as well as every
bank in the country were translated into latitude and longitude
coordinates (a process known as geocoding) by an online addressmatching service."'
Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
software, the latitude and longitude coordinates of every known payday
lender and bank in the country were plotted as points on a map.1 02
Throughout most of the country the number and location of payday
lenders and banks are constantly changing, making our database, to a
degree, a moving target. Nevertheless, we believe that this database is
the most comprehensive map of payday lender locations yet created.
Once the addresses of payday lenders and banks were plotted as points
on a map of the United States, we superimposed series of boundary maps
upon the point map. Altogether, we analyzed the payday lending in six
different statistical categories: states, counties, ZIP codes, state lower
house legislative districts, state upper house legislative districts, and
federal U.S. House of Representatives districts. With the addition of
Census data, °3 these superimposed boundary maps allowed us to create a
series of easily understood statistical measures of payday lending at a
variety of geographic scale levels. Moreover, the legislative district
mapping allowed some statistical analysis regarding the relationship
between the prevalence of payday lending and the composition and party
affiliations of congressional delegations. At the federal level, our
database allowed us to compare payday lender density to Congressional
voting patterns.
In addition to the simple count of payday lenders at each scale level,
we also calculated the density of payday lenders on a per capita basis and
a "per bank" basis. Taking per capita measures of this industry is
important because simple counts of payday lending, especially at the
more local scale, can be misleading. Some places, such as California and
101. Map Multiple Locations by Address, http://www.batchgeocode.com/ (last visited
Mar. 19, 2008). This website uses the Yahoo! Geocoding API, a commercial street map
database, which is considered more accurate than the commonly-used TIGER street map
database. Id.

102. This software, ESRI ArcMap 9.2, is a common professional geography computer
program that allows users to compile, author, analyze, map, and publish geographic
information. See Environmental System Research Institute, ArcGIS: The Complete
Enterprise System, http://www.esri.com/software/arcgis/index.html (last visited Mar. 19,
2008).
103. See U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000: Demographic Profiles, Summary File 3,
http://www.census.gov[Press-Release/www/2002/sumfile3.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
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many metropolitan counties, have enormous numbers of payday lenders;
but when these counts are normalized by the number of citizens in each
district, we find that other locations with smaller populations have much
higher densities of payday lenders. By the same token, some locations
with only a few payday lenders may appear unburdened by the industry
until the per capita measurement is taken, whereupon one finds that this
count may be far more than one would expect for the population in that
region.
Finally, we combined our count of payday lenders and banks at each
spatial scale level to create a statistical measure of commercial density
called a location quotient.'9 Location quotients are the primary method
professional geographers use to measure the relative density of a variety
of economic activities. 5 Our location quotient formula allowed us to
measure the density of payday lenders, relative to banks, within a given
geographic area.O6 Once payday lenders were counted and the per capita
104. This statistic, which is essentially a ratio of payday lenders to banks, helps put into
context the zoning and business climates in which payday lenders operate. For an
excellent introduction further explaining statistical geography, see JAMES E. BURT &
GERALD M. BARBER, ELEMENTARY STATISTICS FOR GEOGRAPHERS 1-30 (2d ed. 1996).
105. One standard location quotient formula is,
Xi

Y,

LQ- EY
where LQ is the location quotient, X and Y are the businesses in question, and i is the
geographic location, such as a ZIP code or a county. GARETH SHAW & DENNIS
WHEELER, STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES IN GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 313 (2d ed. 1994).
106. Because there are many ZIP codes with no payday lenders, the standard location
quotient formula is not suited to measuring this industry. Accordingly, we modified this
formula in order to include those areas without payday lenders and to allow analysis of
subtle differences between two areas with identical ratios of banks to payday lenders, but
with different numbers (volumes) of banks and payday lenders. Some ZIP codes, and
indeed some entire counties, function as retail, service, and commercial districts for
surrounding areas. These areas have a tendency to have both higher numbers of payday
lenders and higher per capita densities of payday lenders than those areas they serve.
Moreover, our location quotient allows us to determine if the ratio of payday lenders to
banks is greater than the statewide (or nationwide) ratio for these two industries.
Accordingly, our location quotient formula is:
i
+ Y)
LQ, = X I(X

x,,/(x,,+ Y,,)

where LQi is the local location quotient for a given geographic area, Xi are the payday
lenders for that area, Yi are the banks, Xn equals the sum of payday lenders statewide or
nationally, and Yn equals the sum of banks statewide or nationally. Thus, the formula
might be expressed as "the location quotient at location i is equal to the ratio of payday
lenders at location i (Xi) to the sum of payday lenders (Xi) and banks (Yi) at location I,
divided by the ratio of all payday lenders (Xn) to the sum of all payday lenders (Xn) and
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and location quotient figures were generated, each geographic area was
then given a rank based on three variables for ZIP codes, counties, and
states. Legislative districts were ranked using per capita and location
quotient ranks because districts have roughly equal populations, making
the third rank statistically redundant. The ranks were then averaged
together to create a composite ranking. This composite ranking provides
what we believe is the most reasonable and transparent measure of the
prevalence of payday lending within a geographic area.
B. Measuring the PoliticalPower of Conservative ChristianAmericans
Once the maps and statistical pictures of payday lending were
complete, we then turned our attention to measuring the political power
of conservative Christian Americans, in order to examine its effects on
usury law. Measuring the power of Christian values in the legislative
process is no easy task, especially at the state level, but we believe that
we have created a reasonable proxy. This proxy, which we refer to as the
Christian Power Index (CPI), was generated by ranking states according
to three variables: (1) the per capita density of evangelical Christians and
Mormons; (2) a Christian Political Organization score for state-wide
delegations and individual members of Congress, calculated by averaging
the "score" assigned to each member of the U.S. House of
Representatives and U.S. Senate by a panel of three conservative
Christian political action groups; and (3) an average statewide
congressional delegation voting record on sociocultural issues as
published online by Professors Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal.'°7
The first of the three measures in our CPI involved trying to rank
states based on the simple percentage of people whom we believe are
prone to use their Christian faith to guide them as they vote for public
officials. However, obtaining good data on religious affiliation was
all banks (Yn)." More simply stated, the location quotient equals the local ratio of payday
lenders to banks plus payday lenders, divided by the equivalent ratio at the state (or
national) level. In states where payday lending is legal, we assigned a value of 0.01 to
those ZIP codes and the occasional county that lacked a bank or a payday lender, which
enabled us to assign a location quotient to those areas.
107. The Poole and Rosenthal index is a highly sophisticated and well-regarded
measure of voting behavior for federal legislators. University of California, San Diego,
Dr. Keith T. Poole, Welcome to the Voteview Website, http://voteview.com (last visited
Mar. 19, 2008) [hereinafter Voteview]. We used data from the 108th Congress, because
that Congress was the last session for which all the data could be obtained for each
legislative district. Royce Carroll, Jeff Lewis, James Lo, Keith Poole & Howard
Rosenthal, DW-NOMINATE Scores with Bootstrapped Standard Errors, http://
voteview.com/dwnomin.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2008) (last updated Aug. 15, 2007). This
Congress also perhaps best reflects the public mood and the legislative and political
environment during a period when many states were considering (or reconsidering)
legislation on payday lending.
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difficult. The geography of religion has been plagued by scant and
unreliable data on church membership.'O' Churches are known to
overstate the size of their congregations, and congregations differ
regarding who is a "member."' ' For example, some churches count
children while others do not. Some churches, perhaps those with little or
no ties to national or regional organizations, are likely to be underrepresented because they may have addresses that change frequently or
other conditions that make them hard to include in a census of church
membership. " ' Other means have been employed to define the "Bible
Belt." For example, Stephen Tweedie used viewership ratings of socalled televangelist programs to demonstrate that televised evangelical
preachers are most popular in the traditional Deep South, but also in the
conservative Methodist and Lutheran areas of the Midwest."'
Fortunately, data on religious affiliation and membership has greatly
improved in recent years and quality data is readily available from an
online database maintained by the Association of Religion Data
Archives (ARDA)."'
We used ARDA data to build one-third of our Christian Power Index.
For this measure we collected the rates of adherents for all evangelical
denominations in each state."' 3 To this rate, we added the rates of
108. James R. Shortridge, Patternsof Religion in the United States, 66 GEOGRAPHICAL
REV. 420, 420 (1976) (pointing out the need for "more generalized, diagnostic aspects of
[religious geography]"); Wilbur Zelinsky, An Approach to the Religious Geography of the
United States: Patterns of Church Membership in 1952, 51 ANNALS ASs'N AM.
GEOGRAPHERS 139, 139-40 (1961) (observing that a literature review revealed
"surprisingly little discussion of the subject").
109. Shortridge, supra note 108, at 420-21.
110. Id. at 421 & nn.5-9.
111. Stephen W. Tweedie, Viewing the Bible Belt, 11 J. POPULAR CULTURE 865, 87475 (1978).
112. See The Association of Religion Data Archives, Maps and Reports, http://
www.thearda.com/mapsReports/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2008). This archive, housed at
Pennsylvania State University, is valued by researchers as the best data source of its sort
anywhere. For further information regarding data quality see The Association of Religion
Data Archives, About the ARDA, http://www.thearda.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2008).
113. For a list of which denominations are included under the umbrella of
"Evangelical Protestant Denominations" see The Association of Religion Data Archives,
Evangelical Protestant Denominations, http://www.thearda.com/mapsReports/reports/
evangelical.asp [hereinafter ARDA Evangelical Protestant Denominations] (last visited
Mar. 19, 2008). Generally speaking, ARDA researchers define evangelical Christians as
those who believe in a strict interpretation of biblical scripture, claim a personal
relationship with Jesus Christ, actively seek new converts, and ascribe to the notion that
Christian doctrine is a useful guide to political and cultural issues in the modern world.
See Brian Steensland et al., The Measure of American Religion: Toward Improving the
State of the Art, 79 SOC. FORCES 291, 294 (2000); see also The Association of Religion
Data Archives, Sources for Religious Congregations & Membership Data, http://www.
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adherence for persons belonging to The Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints, commonly called Mormons."' Many consider Mormons,
though quite different from evangelicals in many respects on theological
matters, to be largely in line with most evangelical Protestants on
political and economic issues."'
The second component of our CPI was built from the opinions of
conservative Christian groups actively engaged in the political process.
We believe that such groups are well-suited to evaluate the conservative
Christian credentials of legislators and that it is important to use the
public voice of conservative Christians themselves. We used vote
"scorecards" published online by Project Vote Smart for three prominent
Christian political action organizations: the Christian Coalition, the
Family Research Council, and the Christian Action Network. "6 Our
thearda.com/mapsReports/RCMS-Notes.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2008). Denominations
included in the evangelical category include many of the denominations commonly
associated with the Christian Right, including many Baptist churches, various Pentecostal
denominations, and a host of other conservative and fundamentalist groups, as well as
most non-denominational congregations. See ARDA Evangelical Protestant Denominations, supra. Mainline Protestants, in contrast to evangelicals, tend to be less literal in
their interpretation of the Bible and less aggressive in their proselytizing activities, and
tend to keep separate their religious and political activities. See Steensland, supra, at 29394. Among the denominations included in the mainline Protestant category are most
Lutheran churches, many Methodists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, and others. See The
Association of Religion Data Archives, Mainline Protestant Denominations, http://www.
thearda.com/mapsReports/reports/mainline.asp [hereinafter ARDA Mainline Protestant
Denominations] (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
114. ARDA researchers exclude Mormons from both the evangelical and mainline
Protestant classifications. See ARDA Evangelical Protestant Denominations, supra note
113 (excluding the Mormon Church from the list); ARDA Mainline Protestant
Denominations, supra note 113 (same). Because Mormons are a significant presence in
several Western states and clearly exert an influence on politics in the states in which they
are numerous, they were included in this study. Moreover, because the Mormon Church
is frequently allied with evangelical Christians on political and cultural issues, their rates of
adherence were added to the rates for evangelical Christians to provide a measure of
religious conservatives that is both robust and nationally representative.
115. The combination of evangelical Christians and Mormons is not intended to
suppose some theological similarity, but rather reflects the fact that adherents of the two
groups tend to share political values. See Shortridge, supra note 108, at 425 tbl.1
(including Mormons on a list of "[c]onservative [p]rotestant [b]odies" in a geographic
study of religion in the U.S.). Some mainline Protestant and evangelical Christians take a
skeptical view of Mormons, arguing they are not Christians. For their part, the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints describes itself as part of the Christian faith and all
Mormons consider the Bible part of their scriptures. See Gary J. Coleman, "Mom, Are We
Christians?",ENSIGN, May 2007, at 92, 93-94. It is not our intention to take a position on
this or any other theological view. With respect to this controversy, our description of
Mormons as tending to be conservative Christians should be seen as a rhetorically
convenient characterization, rather than a position of faith.
116. Project Vote Smart is a leading non-partisan, non-profit political research
organization whose goal is the promotion of democracy through the dissemination of
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purposes would have been better suited if these organizations rated
every member of every local state legislature, rather than just the
members of Congress because state legislators are largely responsible for
crafting much of the law that regulates payday lending. As it is, we have
chosen to use the scores assigned to federal legislators as a proxy for
their counterparts in state government.
Our proxy measure was
generated by calculating the average of the three organizations'
performance evaluation ratings for each member of the U.S. House of
Representatives and U.S. Senate during the 108th Congress (2003-2005).
An average score for each state's federal delegation (House and Senate)
was also calculated to provide a numeric value for each state.
The final third of our CPI was derived from research conducted by
Poole and Rosenthal, two well-known and statistically sophisticated
political scientists who publish their measures of congressional voting
behavior online."' Using Poole and Rosenthal's roll call data, we
extracted scores that reflect the tendency of a legislator to vote as a
"social conservative" or a "social progressive..". We then calculated and
ranked the average score for each state's entire congressional delegation,
including its senators. 1 9
candidate information. See Project Vote Smart, About Project Vote Smart, http://www.
votesmart.org/program-about-pvs.php (last visited Mar. 19, 2008); see also Project Vote
Smart, American Government, Election, Candidates and Voting, http://www.votesmart.
org/index.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2008). These performance evaluations provide voters
with a zero to one hundred rating or a letter grade for each legislator, with higher numbers
or grades going to officials who voted for legislation favored by the organization creating
the scorecard and against legislation not favored by these organizations. Project Vote
Smart, About Our Special Interest Group Ratings, http://www.votesmart.org/issue-ratingcategory.about.php (last visited Mar. 19, 2008). To view these interest group ratings for
specific legislators, see http://www.votesmart.org/official five-categories.php?dist=issueratingcategory.php (last visited Mar. 19, 2008) (providing a database searchable by state).
117. See Voteview, supra note 107.
118. We extracted the DW-NOMINATE second dimension scores from the Poole and
Rosenthal database for each member of the U.S. House of Representatives and for each
U.S. Senator for the 108th Congress. See Carroll, Lewis, Lo, Poole & Rosenthal supra
note 107. The second dimension scores are based on actual yea or nay voting records. See
id. The designation of voting as "social conservative" or a "social progressive" is Poole
and Rosenthal's rather than our own.
119. It is worth noting that there were some significant discrepancies between the
Christian political organizations' scores and the measure of social conservatism Poole and
Rosenthal generated from congressional voting records. The discrepancies may be partly
a result of differences stemming from the relatively few legislative items considered by the
Christian political organizations, and the broader range of social/cultural votes measured
by Poole and Rosenthal. It may also be due in part to the obvious differences in agendas
driving the Christian political organizations and Poole and Rosenthal. These interesting
discrepancies may be worthy of a separate research project, but they reinforce the logic
that has driven our multi-faceted attempt to measure Christian political power. Even if it
were to be proven that these three Christian political organizations do not accurately
measure the voting record of the candidates they rate, these scores do accurately reflect

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 57:637

After each state had been ranked according to these three measures,
the three rankings were then averaged to create the CPI and a CPI
ranking. States in the Deep South and Mountain West rank high on our
CPI, whereas states in New England and the Mid-Atlantic rank low.
These findings confirm the common logic that many evangelicals and
Mormons live in the Deep South and Mountain West respectively, that
their congressional representatives vote in accordance with the Christian
values publicly espoused by their constituency, and that these voting
records have been favorably confirmed and recognized by Christian
organizations such as the Christian Coalition, which monitor the political
behavior of elected officials on behalf of their followers. Our hope is
that this index of Christian political power, which is partly derived from
the data collected at the federal level, will accurately reflect the political
climate of the respective states.120 Our CPI does closely match the
findings of other interstate measures of political ideology. Our measure
of ideological power differs from others, however, in that it focuses more
squarely on the role conservative Christians have on political ideology by
including the opinions of Christian political organizations and accounting
for the percentage of evangelical Christians and Mormons in the
electorate. Finally, by using simple statistical methods and widely
available data, we also hoped to make our rankings as transparent as
possible.

III. FINDINGS: PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA AND IN THE BIBLE BELT
In applying these methodologies we reach two empirical findings: First,
rapid growth in the payday lending industry has fundamentally
transformed the American financial services landscape.
Second,
the opinions of these organizations. We gladly defer to their opinions because they are a
legitimate barometer of what these powerful, openly evangelical Christian political
advocacy groups believe, and want their congregations and affiliates to believe, about
legislators.
120. Cf. William D. Berry et. al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the
American States 1960-93, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327, 327-48 (1998) (discussing the challenges
of measuring the political ideology of citizens and elected officials and using federal
delegation data in addition to other data to produce a measure of state ideology); Thomas
M. Holbrook-Provow & Steven C. Poe, MeasuringState Political Ideology, 15 AM. POL. Q.
399, 399-400 (1987) (defining "state political ideology" and observing that "the ability to
measure state political ideology is essential to many analyses carried out at the state
level"); David Nice & Jeffrey Cohen, Ideological Consistency Among State Party
Delegations to the U.S. House, Senate, and National Conventions, 64 SOC. SCI. Q. 871, 877
(1983) (finding that state party delegations tend to show "ideological consistency... in the
House, Senate, and national conventions" and attributing this to the efforts of political
activists, the efforts of each party's coalition to adopt a certain position, and the cycle of
attracting and repelling potential members of the party through emphasis on a consistent
image).
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conservative Christian Americans are a prime demographic target of
payday lenders. This Part also includes four case studies of particularly
illustrative states.
A. Payday Lending Has Fundamentally Transformed the American
FinancialServices Landscape

Historically, American usury law scrupulously conformed to biblical
values. Early American usury law grew directly out of the condemnation
of usury by early Protestant theologians.'
Indeed, the first American
usury law, adopted by the Massachusetts colony in 1641, predated the
United States Constitution by nearly 150 years. 2 2 That statute, recalling
moral limits suggested by Martin Luther, limited rates to no more than
eight percent per annum.
Although the Founding Fathers of the
United States disagreed on many issues, they were virtually unanimous in
their support of reasonable limits on the prices of loans. 12 4 Indeed, each
delegate to the Constitutional Convention returned home to a state with
aggressively enforced usury limits.125
Historians agree that early
American usury laws were generally modeled on the price cap included
in the English Statute of Anne.12 ' This statute, in turn, was deeply
influenced by the Christian perception of biblical truth prevalent at the
time. Early American usury law was also premised on a deep skepticism,
not only of the forthrightness of borrowers, but also of the morality and
honesty of consumer creditors. The universality of Colonial adoption of
simple nominal annual interest rate limits of12 between
five and eight
7
percent attests to an early American thrift ethic.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, reformers in many states
believed that these limits were too low to provide legal, safe financing for
middle class borrowers.' 28 At this point, many states passed small loan
121. See Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of
Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1116-

18 (2008).
122. RANSOM H. TYLER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF USURY, PAWNS OR PLEDGES,
AND MARITIME LOANS 50 (1873).
123. See id.; see also Peterson, supra note 121, at 1118.

124. See Peterson, supra note 121, at 1118.
125. Id., at 1118 & tbl.1 (showing that all thirteen original states adopted usury limits).
At independence, Virginia had the lowest price cap, allowing a simple nominal annual rate
of only five percent. Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island capped rates at a simple nominal annual interest rate of
six percent. New Jersey and New York limited rates to seven percent. Georgia,
Massachusetts, and South Carolina allowed eight percent. Id.; see also TYLER, supra note
122, at 50-53.
126. See Peterson, supra note 121, at 1116 & n.13.
127. See id. at 1118-19.
128. See id. at 1120.
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laws, which gave some lenders licenses to charge simple interest rates of
between eighteen and forty-two percent per year. 2 9 To obtain these
licenses, lenders were required to submit to regulatory oversight and
could be sued by customers for exceeding the legal interest rate limit or
for violating other regulations. 130 In most states, these special usury laws
remained in force throughout most of the twentieth century, including
during the Great Depression and the Second World War.' As late as
1965, every state in the Republic retained relatively aggressive usury laws
with a median limit of approximately thirty-six percent.132 Similarly, in
1968 Congress passed a loan-sharking law establishing a federal crime for
engaging in extortionate lending.133 Under this law, one part of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, a price amounting to a simple nominal
annual rate of more than 3forty-five
percent is considered evidence of
4
extortionate loan-sharking.

129. See id. (discussing the model Small Loan Law developed by the Russell-Sage
Foundation and adopted by most states).
130. See id. (citing ROGER S. BARRETT, COMPILATION OF CONSUMER FINANCE
LAWS AND OF USURY, SALES FINANCE AND ALLIED LAWS 677 (1952)) (noting the
existence of the licensing requirement).
131. See id.
132. See id. at 121 & app. tbl.5.
133. Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 202(a), 82 Stat. 146, 15962 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (2000)).
134. The law provides:
(b) In any prosecution under this section, if it is shown that all of the following
factors were present in connection with the extension of credit in question, there
is prima facie evidence that the extension of credit was extortionate... :
(1) The repayment of the extension of credit, or the performance of any
promise given in consideration thereof, would be unenforceable, through civil
judicial processes against the debtor
(A) in the jurisdiction within which the debtor, if a natural person, resided
or
(B) in every jurisdiction within which the debtor, if other than a natural
person, was incorporated or qualified to do business at the time the extension of
credit was made.
(2) The extension of credit was made at a rate of interest in excess of an annual
rate of 45 per centum calculated according to the actuarial method of allocating
payments made on a debt between principal and interest, pursuant to which a
payment is appliedfirst to the accumulated interest and the balance is applied to the
unpaid principal.
(3) At the time the extension of credit was made, the debtor reasonably
believed that either
(A) one or more extensions of credit by the creditor had been collected or
attempted to be collected by extortionate means, or the nonrepayment thereof
had been punished by extortionate means; or
(B) the creditor had a reputation for the use of extortionate means to
collect extensions of credit or to punish the nonrepayment thereof.
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However, in recent decades, the traditional American legal response to
high-cost consumer loans has corroded. At least two factors facilitated
the slackening in usury law. First, the Supreme Court sparked a new era
of federal preemption of state usury limits by granting national banks the
authority to export throughout the country high interest rate limits from
states such as Delaware and South Dakota.'35 Second, high inflation
during this period caused prevailing market interest rates to rise,
shrinking the potential
•.
•
136 profit margin separating lenders' cost of funds
and their legal limits.
Rather than creating temporary exceptions to
ancient usury rules, or allowing interest rate limits to float with an index
317
of prevailing rates, a few legislatures repealed their limits altogether.
Other legislatures became more receptive to statutes that grant
permission for lenders to lend at prices that would have shocked earlier
generations of Americans. 38 It was through this new breach in the wall
of traditional American usury law that payday lenders began flowing at
the end of 1980s to early 1990s.

(4) Upon the making of the extension of credit, the total of the extensions of
credit by the creditor to the debtor then outstanding, including any unpaid
interest or similar charges, exceeded $ 100.
18 U.S.C. § 892 (emphasis added).
135. See Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S.
299, 312-13 (1978). The impact of this decision has been widely discussed. See, e.g.,
William F. Baxter, Section 85 of the National Bank Act and Consumer Welfare, 1995 UTAH
L. REV. 1009, 1010-11, 1028 (observing that Marquette "undoubtedly played a major role
in fostering the spectacular growth of the credit card industry"); Richard P. Eckman, The
Delaware Consumer Credit Bank Act and 'Exporting' Interest Under Section 521 of the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 39 BUS. LAW.
1264, 1264-70 (1984) (discussing Delaware legislation designed to entice banking
organizations to establish banks in the state, and noting that those banks relied on
Marquette "in order to export the liberal Delaware rate structure to residents of other
states"); Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The
Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 68586 (1987) ("South Dakota and Delaware quickly seized upon the opportunity to take
advantage of the ruling by deregulating interest rates and other banking functions in order
to attract banks and credit card companies that operate solely on an 'export' basis. As in
corporation law, the practical effect has been to force competing states to deregulate
similarly .... " (footnote omitted)); Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and
High-Cost Consumer Credit: The HistoricalContext of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA.
L. REV. 807, 873-74 (2003) ("In practice, nine Supreme Court justices eliminated two
hundred years of democratic state interest rate regulation of bank loans."); James J.
White, The Usury Trompe I'Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445, 447-48 (2000) ("[U]nder the
Marquette doctrine, the sternest state laws are the first to be undermined and the quickest
to fall.").
136. Peterson, supra note 135, at 872-73.
137. Id. at 873 (quoting KATHLEEN E. KEEST, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE
COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 55 (1995)).
138. See id.
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Figure A. Nationwide Growth of Payday Lender vs.
Starbucks Coffee Shop Locations, 1990-2005
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The growth of American payday lending in the 1990s and 2000s was so
rapid that some context is useful in comprehending it. Figure A contrasts
the growth in the number of payday lending outlets with the growth in
the number of Starbuck's coffee shops.139 There is, of course, no
relationship between Starbucks and payday lending. Still, as a matter of
historical coincidence, Starbucks began its rapid ascension to become the
leading coffee chain in the country at about the same time it became
clear that the financial services industry lobby had successfully removed
legal impediments to payday lending. Starbucks' growth is thus a good
yardstick against which to measure payday lending because that growth
has been so widely heralded. One commentator called Starbucks' rise to
prominence "[niot unlike the cultural blitz of personal computing.
Some believe that Starbucks was the most explosively successful

139. See Starbucks Coffee Company, Company Timeline, http://www.starbucks.com/
aboutus/Company_ Timeline Feb06.pdf (last updated Feb. 2008) (providing Starbucks
location data). Payday lender location data are estimates gathered from a variety of
sources. See MICHELLE HODSON, SERENA OWENS & STEVE FRrTrs, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., PAYDAY LENDING (2003), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/012903fyi.
html (providing 1990 estimate); Stegman & Faris, supra note 20, at 8 (providing 2000
estimate); Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 22, at 1 (providing 2005 estimate). The 1995
estimate of four thousand locations is the estimate of the authors of this Article.
140. Jennifer Reese, Starbucks: Inside the Coffee Cult, FORTUNE, Dec. 9, 1996, at 190,
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century.141
American retail company in the second half of the twentieth
Still, this growth pales in comparison to the growth of payday lending
outlets in the wake of slackening usury limits. By 2005, the seemingly
ubiquitous 8,569 Starbucks locations were dwarfed by an estimated
22,000 payday loan outlets. Once usury laws were lifted, payday lenders
poured into American neighborhoods like water over a breached dam.
Figure B. Payday Lender Location National Point Map, 2007
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Figure B provides a point map that represents our accumulated
database of payday lender addresses. We estimate that there are
currently 24,017 payday lender locations in the United States. We
believe this is the best estimate of the size and location of the American
payday lending industry currently available to the public. The specific
estimates of the number of payday lenders within each state, county, and
legislative district are available in the Appendix following this Article.
But, generally speaking, payday lenders charging average simple nominal
annual interest rates of approximately 450% are now in every region of
141. See, e.g., HOWARD SCHULTZ & DORI JONES YANG, POUR YOUR HEART INTO
IT 5 (1997) ("[W]e built Starbucks from a local business with 6 stores and less than 100
employees into a national one with more than 1,300 stores and 25,000 employees.... Both
sales and profits have grown by more than 50 percent a year for six consecutive years.").
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the country, both in the heartland and on the coasts. Lax usury laws in
New Hampshire and Rhode Island have given triple-digit interest rate
payday lenders a strong foothold in New England. Payday lending is
flourishing in four out of five of the nation's most populous states:
California (first most populous), Texas (second), Florida (fourth), and
The upper Midwestern states have large and growing
Illinois (fifth).'
payday lending industries, as do the arid Western states relative to their
population. Not pictured above, Hawaii and Alaska also have active
payday lending industries.4 4 The only states where we could not find
large payday lending industries were those states that have passed
aggressive usury laws limiting interest rates to levels traditionally in force
throughout American history. 14
Figure C. Payday Lender Locations vs. McDonald's Restaurant Locations
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142. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NST-EST2007-01, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE
POPULATION FOR THE UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1,

2000 TO JULY 1, 2007 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NSTEST2007-01.xls (providing population estimates as of July 1, 2007). New York is the
nation's third most populous state. See id.
143. See infra app. tbl.1.
144. See discussion infra Part III.C.4.
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To put the fundamental nature of this change in financial services into
context, Figure C compares the total number of payday lenders in each
state to the state's total number of McDonald's franchises, the world's
most common and widely recognized restaurant chain. Each state
number was generated by taking the number of payday lenders in each
state and subtracting the total number of the state's McDonald's
franchises.' 45 In most states where usury limits allow payday loans, the
number of payday loan locations easily exceeds the number of
McDonald's restaurants. For example, in Florida, Texas, and California
there are 436, 783, and 1286 more payday lender locations than
McDonald's locations respectively. The disparity is even greater in some
smaller states. Missouri, Mississippi, and Alabama all have over nine
hundred more payday lenders than they have McDonald's franchises.
Payday lending was virtually non-existent in the United States in the
early 1990s.1 46 But today, payday lenders, who charge prices nearly twice
those of the New York City mafia during its heyday,147 have exploded
into an industry with over twenty thousand retail outlets nationwidemore than the total number of McDonald's, Burger King, Sears, J.C.
Penney, and Target stores combined.' 48 For those who are concerned
about the social, moral, and even spiritual wellbeing of lower- and
moderate-income Americans, this is a profound, unprecedented, and
troubling change in the American nation.
B. Conservative ChristianAmericans Are a Prime Demographic Target
for Payday Lenders
The transformation in the American financial services industry under
the new usury-permissive legal regime has not affected all Americans in
the same way. Prior research has documented that payday lending 4is
found in places with high poverty levels and large minority populations. 1
However, it is more surprising that conservative Christian Americans
also appear to be a prime demographic target for high-cost payday loans,
145. See generally McDonald's USA Restaurant Locator, http://www.mcdonalds.com/
usa/restlocator.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2008) (providing a database of all McDonald's
locations searchable by ZIP code or city, allowing for calculations to be made by state).
146. Stegman & Faris, supra note 20, at 8.
147. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
148.

See HOWARD KARGER, SHORTCHANGED 6 (2005).

149.

See, e.g., KENNETH TEMKIN & NOAH SAWYER, URBAN INST. METRO. HOUS. &
CMTYS. POLICY CTR., ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS 1-2
(2004), available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/pdf/021904altfin_
servproviders.pdf (prepared for the Fannie Mae Foundation) (studying check-casher,
pawnshop, and payday lender location patterns in Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, Kansas
City, Los Angeles, Memphis, Miami, and Washington, D.C.); Graves, supra note 97, at
311-12 (studying payday lender location patterns in urban Illinois and Louisiana).
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as Figure D illustrates. Moreover, it seems clear that their politicians are
helping to place the target on their constituents' backs. Our database of
payday lender locations and index of conservative Christian political
power suggests that payday lenders tend to concentrate in high densities
in conservative Christian states.
FigureD. States Ranked According to Payday Lending and Conservative
ChristianAmerican PoliticalPower,2007
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Figure D provides a graphic illustration. This map compares national
rankings of the intensity of payday lending within a state to the political
power of conservative Christian Americans within that state. In state
after state where conservative Christians hold high levels of political
power, we found tremendous densities of payday lending relative to state
population and to the number of banks. Indeed, by every measure and
every test, we found that states with a high conservative Christian
legislative score also have high densities of payday lenders. A quick
examination of the map in Figure D, as well as that in Figure B above,
makes it clear that the relationship would have been even stronger had
Georgia and North Carolina, two states with significant conservative
Christian political power, not recently outlawed payday lending.5
Despite these two recent exceptions, the evidence permits no doubt that
living in a state with a great deal of conservative Christian legislative
150. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-3-14 (2007) (limiting credit prices to a level below which
payday lending can successfully function); N.C. GEN STAT. § 53-173 (2005) (same).
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power actually puts lower- and moderate-income consumers at greater
risk from usurious payday loans due to their exposure to more
opportunities to use payday lending services.
Figure E. States Ranked by Payday Lending Activity and
ChristianPolitical Power,2007
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States Ranked by Payday Lending Activity

Similarly, the scatterplot diagram in Figure E illustrates the correlation
between the political power of conservative Christian Americans and the
prevalence of payday lending. In this figure, states in the upper-right
quadrant are ranked above average in both Christian political power and
payday lending activity. Conversely, states in the lower-left quadrant
rank below average in both Christian political power and payday lending
activity. Finally, states in the upper-left quadrant rank above average in
Christian political power and below average in payday lending activity;
the reverse is true for states in the lower-right quadrant. States that have
no interest rate cap or explicitly authorize payday loans with a licensing
statute are designated with a * symbol, while those that retain a
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traditional usury limit prohibitive of payday loans are designated with an
x. One would expect more of the states with legal restrictions on usury to
be in the upper quadrants because these states scored high on our index
of Christian political power. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect
that states with a large evangelical and/or Mormon population and a
legislature that is well-received by Christian political organizations to
feature legislation restricting payday lending inspired by the numerous
biblical injunctions against usury. Conversely, it is surprising that in
many states where evangelicals and Mormons are few, and where
legislators have proven to be neither socially conservative nor wellreceived by Christian political organizations, that scripturally-inspired
usury laws effectively banning payday lending remain. Only a few states
fit the pattern one would expect. Georgia, North Carolina, and to a
lesser extent West Virginia each have above average rankings for
Christian political power and have seen fit to ban usury. Georgia and
North Carolina have recently reintroduced bans. West Virginia has
maintained its ban on usury for many years."' Similarly, but in reverse,
are Delaware, California, and Nevada, three states where low levels of
Christian political power may have helped permit usurious businesses to
flourish. Yet among the states with lower than average Christian
political power, only Arizona and Nevada rank among the top ten worst
Compounding the curiously inverse
states for payday lending.
relationship we have found is a statistical technique that has somewhat
mitigated the intensity of this unexpected correlation. Several of the
states that ranked high on payday lending activity, such as Ohio,
California, and Florida, earned their lofty rankings partly because of the
sheer number of payday lenders within their borders. Clearly this is a
byproduct of the large populations in those states. If each of these states,
all with low Christian political scores, were considered just on the basis of
commercial and per capita densities, each would tumble in their ranking
for payday lending and move toward the lower-left quadrant of the
diagram.
Moreover, the inferences suggested by Figures D and E are borne out
in statistical analysis. The Spearman's correlation coefficient of our
payday lending severity index and Christian power index equals 0.559,
which is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. 152 In simple terms, this
151.
152.

See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-4-107(2) (LexisNexis 2006).
The standard Spearman's ranking formula is
6 i4'
n(n 2 -

1)

University of the West of England, Spearman's Coefficient of Rank Correlation,
http://hsc.uwe.ac.uk/dataanalysis/quantinfassspear.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
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means that we can be ninety-nine percent sure that about fifty-sex
percent of the time, when the Christian political power goes up, payday
lending per capita also rises. While this is by no means a perfect
correlation-reflecting the great complexity of American life-it is
nonetheless a strong relationship that bears further examination and
reflection. By way of comparison, we also measured the correlation
between our payday lending severity index and both the percent of the
non-white population and the percent of persons living below the
poverty level with the same Spearman's correlation coefficient.'53 Again
confirming past research, the race and poverty correlations with payday
lending were strong and statistically significant.' m But, to our surprise,
neither race nor poverty proved as highly correlated as our measure of
conservative Christian political power. To state these relationships
differently, other things being equal, the political power of conservative
Christians within a state is a better predictor of payday lending severity
than either race or poverty.
As interesting as these poverty and race correlation coefficients are, it
is equally important to note what they do not establish. The core finding
of this study is simply that lenders are relatively numerous in most
Southern and Midwestern states. It is also true that payday lenders are
relatively more numerous in states with larger populations living in
poverty and with larger nonwhite populations. However, other things
being equal, the likelihood of a state having higher payday lender
densities is greater as Christian power rises than it is as poverty or
nonwhite populations rise. Nevertheless, because we do not conduct
multivariate regressions, our analysis cannot establish whether the
greater numbers of payday lenders are present in conservative Christian
states because of the faith orientation of those state's populations. The
correlation coefficients with the percent of state populations living below
the poverty line and the percent of the nonwhite population are provided
only to give some context to our primary finding. While the correlation
coefficient for Christian power and payday lending density is greater
than race or poverty, it is nevertheless entirely possible that race or
poverty have a causal effect on payday lender location density, whereas
religious beliefs do not. Such a conclusion would be entirely consistent
with our findings. The geographic overlap between payday lending
density and conservative Christian states may be coincidental-our data
cannot confirm or verify this proposition. Still, the simple and important
153. Both measures were made at the state level of geographic resolution and relied
on year 2000 minority status and poverty data reported by the U.S. Census Bureau.
154. The Spearman's correlation between our payday lending density index and the
percent of the non-white population was 0.006. The correlation with the percent of the
population below the poverty line was 0.499.
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point remains: there are a disproportionate number of payday lenders in
conservative Christian states.
Table 1. Top 30 Payday Lending Counties in the United States, 2007.
St.

Pop.

PDL

Banks

PDL per
10K Pop.

PDL
Rank

Per Capita
Rank

LQ
Rank

Overall
U.S. Rank

MS

64958

34

22

5.23

142

24

22

1

Florence

SC

125761

57

48

4.53

77

56

81

2

Dunklin

MO

33155

24

13

7.24

214

6

12

3

Panola

MS

34274

23

13

6.71

227

7

13

4

Lauderdale

MS

78161

37

32

4.73

126

44

89

5

117

34

112

6

County

Jones

Marshall

AL

82231

41

40

4.99

Aiken

SC

142552

49

31

3.44

89

153

21

6

MO

29705

25

19

8.42

202

3

63

8

DeSoto

MS

107199

56

59

5.22

78

25

167

9

St. Franqois

MO

55641

28

24

5.03

175

32

84

10

Butler

MO

40867

24

19

5.87

214

15

66

11

St. Mary

LA

53500

26

21

4.86

191

38

71

12

164

125

15

13

Stoddard

Talladega

AL

80321

29

17

3.61

Montgomery

AL

223510

77

70

3.45

51

152

101

13

Tangipahoa

LA

100588

42

41

4.18

113

79

113

15

Grenada

MS

23263

18

8

7.74

296

4

5

15

Ascension

LO

76627

29

21

3.78

164

109

43

17

Houston

AL

88787

37

36

4.17

126

83

111

18

Hinds

MS

250800

83

82

3.31

44

169

115

19

Pike

MS

38940

23

20

5.91

227

13

90

20

Portsmouth

VA

100565

32

13

3.18

154

182

3

21

Spartanburg

SC

253791

80

75

3.15

47

188

106

22

Neshoba

MS

28684

17

11

5.93

314

10

22

23

Leflore

MS

37947

19

13

5.01

280

33

34

24

Sumter

SC

104646

33

17

3.15

150

187

11

25

Lincoln

MS

33166

17

8

5.13

314

28

6

25

36

3.64

121

121

108

27

Terrebonne

LA

104503

38

Scott

MO

40422

21

17

5.2

252

26

72

27

49756

21

14

4.22

252

75

25

29

Russell

AL

This correlation between payday lending density and conservative
Christian political power is also evident when looking at payday lender
severity by county, ZIP code, and legislative district. Table 1 lists the
thirty U.S. counties with the worst payday lending problem after
controlling for both population and commercial density patterns with a
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bank location quotient. We were surprised to find that every county
ranking within this list is located squarely within the American Bible
Belt. Underscoring the extent to which the provision of financial services
has changed, there are more payday lender locations than bank locations
in all of these counties save one. Analyzing the location data through the
geographic frame of ZIP codes and legislative districts paints a
comparable picture. Of the thirty ZIP codes most saturated with payday
lending in the United States, all but three are located in one of the fifteen
most conservative Christian states.'
All but five of the thirty worst
payday lending states' upper house legislative districts1 6 and eight of the
worst lower house legislative districts in the country are found within the
fifteen most conservative Christian states. 5' And of the thirty U.S.
House of Representatives districts most saturated with payday lending,
twenty five (including the 58top ten) are located within the most
conservative Christian states.
C. Payday Lending In Bible Country:Four Case Studies
While our database of payday lenders and political power of
conservative Christian leaders covers all fifty states, space limitations
prevent a presentation of the complete results for each state.'5 Instead,
this section discusses, from a law and geography viewpoint, four states
that shed light on the relationship between payday lending and the
political power of conservative Christians. Alabama, Mississippi, Utah,
and North Carolina are all states with a significant conservative Christian
population and either have or had large payday lending industries.
1. Payday Lenders in the Heartof the Bible Belt: The Alabama
Example
The Alabama legislature has never explicitly repealed its traditional
usury law, which still purports to cap loan prices at a simple nominal
annual interest rate of eight percent.'9 However, today this cap is
riddled with exceptions for various types of lenders, most notably
155. See infra app. tbl.2.
156. See infra app. tbl.3.
157. See infra app. tbl.4.
158. See infra app. tbl.5.
159. In addition to the presentation of state-specific findings of the four states included
in this Article, we have also drafted summary findings for the remaining forty-six states.
The findings for all fifty states are separately available to researchers online at
http://www.csun.edul-sg4002/research/usury.html.
160. ALA. CODE § 8-8-1 (LexisNexis 2002); see also ALA. CODE § 5-18-15(a)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2007) (regulating interest rates on loans of less than one thousand
dollars); ALA. CODE § 5-19-3(a) (LexisNexis 1996) (setting maximum finance charges on
loans of less than two thousand dollars).
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including payday lenders. 161 Shrinking from expressing its state credit
price limit in the time-tested traditional way-with an interest rate-with
some sleight of hand the Alabama legislature authorized licensed payday
lenders to charge up to "17.5 percent of the amount advanced."' 62
Although this modest number may seem innocuous because payday
loans have short initial durations (that frequently remain outstanding for
longer time periods), the Alabama Code actually legalizes loans with
simple annual interest rates of around 456%.163 In addition to the
statute's loose price cap, Alabama law also has a variety of other largely
cosmetic provisions that do not meaningfully impede payday lending.1 64
These provisions mean little given that the legislature has explicitly
authorized loans over two hundred percentage points more expensive
than average New York City mafia loans made in connection with illegal
gambling operations.
This legal environment has facilitated a state commercial pattern
saturated with payday lending when viewed by any of the various
geographic scales of resolution considered in this study. For example,
Congressman Artur Davis has the third most severe payday lending
problem of any U.S. House of Representatives district in the entire
country. In Davis' seventh district there are 202 payday lenders, which is
not only the ninth most of any district, but also ranks eighth worst per
capita nationally. With only 157 banks in the district, the seventh
district's location quotient is fifth worst nationally.165 Terry Everett's
161. The Deferred Presentment Services Act (DPSA) regulates payday lending. ALA.
CODE § 5-18A-1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
162. Id. § 5-18A-12(a).
163. This figure assumes a $325 loan with an initial duration of fourteen days. The
APR figure was calculated with the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's APR
calculation software. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Annual Percentage Rate
Calculation Program for Windows (APRWIN), http://www.occ.treas.gov/aprwin.htm (last
visited Mar. 19, 2008); see also Peterson, supra note 121, at 1128-35 (discussing
methodology of calculating maximum permissible annual percentage rates under state
usury laws). Although payday lenders also could operate under the authority of the
Alabama Small Loan Act, including its thirty-six percent annual interest rate, see ALA.
CODE § 5-18-15(a), lenders clearly would prefer the generous interest rates authorized by
the DPSA. Lenders also may charge a fee of thirty dollars for any bounced check. Id. § 518A-12(d); see also ALA. CODE § 8-8-15(b) (LexisNexis 2002).
164. Loans made under the DPSA are limited to an amount of five hundred dollars.
ALA. CODE § 5-18A-12(a). Their duration must be between ten and thirty-one days. Id. §
5-18A-13(c). Lenders may renew or extend the loan one time. Id. § 5-18A-12(b). Also, a
lender is prohibited from making a new payday loan to pay off an old loan. Id. § 5-18A13(n). Consumer advocates, however, have argued that this type of limit has proven
unenforceable both in Alabama and elsewhere. See RON GILBERT & JIM CARNES, ARISE
CITIZENS' POLICY PROJEcT, HARD CASH: PREDATORY LENDING IN ALABAMA 1 (2004),

http://www.alarise.org/Predatory%201ending%20fact%20sheet%2010-04.pdf.
165. See infra app. tbl.5.
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district has 205 payday lenders, which is the seventh most nationally and
seventh most per capita. Everett's district does have more banks than
payday lenders, but the ratio is still the twenty-first worst in the
country. ' 6 Other congressional districts in Alabama have almost as
much payday lending, with only one representative's district, Spencer
Bachus's, actually falling outside the worst thirty in the country.
When measured through the lens of state legislative districts, Alabama
again appears to have a severe payday lending problem. The nineteenth,
twentieth, and thirty-first state senate districts also rank among the
twenty-five worst for payday lending nationally and statewide. Jimmy
Holley's thirty-first district, adjacent to Fort Rucker, is the worst among
the upper house districts with fifty payday lenders and thirty-seven
banks.167 Moreover, the nineteenth, forty-fifth, and seventy-fourth state
congressional districts have the most payday lending among the lower
house districts, and each ranks among the top twenty-five nationally. Jay
Love's seventy-fourth district on the north side of Montgomery, and only
a few miles from Maxwell Air Force Base, has twenty-five payday
lenders and only eight banks for a relatively small population. Taking all
three measures into account, this is the worst lower house district in the
country. '68 Using only the retail and per capita density figures, it ranks
fifth worst nationally. With twenty payday lenders and only seven banks,9
Owen Drake's forty-fifth district ranks twenty-third worst in the nation.1
Laura Hall's nineteenth district, near Huntsville's Redstone Arsenal, also
has high numbers and densities of payday lenders, ranking twelfth worst
nationally for payday lending. 7 Several counties in Alabama also rank
very high nationally for payday lending. Jefferson County has 159
payday lenders, double what some entire states have. Marshall County
has some forty-one payday lenders and forty banks, as well as a high per
capita density, making it the sixth worst overall in the nation. Dallas
County has the highest per capita density in Alabama and ranks among
the worst one percent nationally in that category. Russell County,
adjacent to Fort Benning, ranks third worst in the state. Several ZIP
codes in Alabama also rank among the worst in the nation for payday
lending. Birmingham's 35228, Northport's 35473, and Montgomery's
36107 ZIP codes, having no banks but multiple payday lenders, each rank
among the ten most lopsided ratios nationally. Decatur's 35601 ZIP code
has twenty-five payday lenders, which is the ninth most of any ZIP code
in the U.S. Overall, Birmingham's 35214 ZIP code is Alabama's worst,
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See infra app.
See infra app.
See infra app.
See infra app.
See infra app.

tbl.5.
tbl.3.
tbl.4.
tbl.4.
tbl.5.
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with almost twenty
17 1 payday lenders, but just five banks for a relatively
small population.
All this-both Alabama's weak regulatory environment and its raging
payday lender infestation-is puzzling given Alabama's impressive Bible
Belt credentials. Alabama ranks first in the country according to our
measure of the political power of conservative Christian Americans.
This ranking is a result of very favorable opinions of its congressional
delegation by the Christian political advocacy groups (seventh best),
their solidly conservative voting behavior (seventh); and the fact that
about forty-one percent of its population is evangelical Christian (fourth
most).17 1 Yet these leaders, who in so many other policy arenas vote in
accordance with biblical values, have stood essentially idle while the state
developed
one of the very worst payday lending problems in the
17 3
country.
2. When Payday Lenders Outnumber Banks: The Mississippi Example
Like Alabama, Mississippi retains a low general usury limit that
harkens back to the vanishing American ethic of thrift.7 4 Moreover,
Mississippi retains a small loan law authorizing licensed lenders to charge
up to thirty-six percent per annum on loans of one thousand dollars or
less. 175 But these limits are now less commercially relevant given
Mississippi's lax payday lending authorization legislation. Mississippi law
prohibits payday lenders from charging more than eighteen percent of
the face amount of a personal check used by a borrower in obtaining a
176
payday loan.
While a casual observer might equate this cap with once
common state usury laws limiting consumer loans to an eighteen percent

171. See infra app. tbl.2.
172. See infra app. tbl.1.
173. See infra app. tbl.1. With 1,192 payday lenders (seventh most) for its roughly 4.5
million people, Alabama ranks third in per capita density of payday lenders. See U.S.
Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts: Alabama, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/01000.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2008) (listing the population of Alabama as
4,599,030 in 2006). Because there are only 1,438 banks in the state, it also ranks third
highest among the states in our relative banking density location quotient measure. Using
our composite index, Alabama has the fourth worst payday lending problem in the
country. See infra app. tbl.1.
174. Mississippi's general usury limit caps rates at "the greater of ten percent (10%)
per annum or five percent (5%) per annum above the discount rate . . . on ninety-day
commercial paper in effect at the [relevant] Federal Reserve bank." MISS. CODE ANN. §
75-17-1(2) (West 1999).
175. Id. § 75-17-21(a).
176. Id. § 75-67-519(4).

2008]

Usury Law and the ChristianRight

simple nominal annual interest rate, the law actually allows an interest
rate of 572.29% on a typical payday loan.1"
This legal environment has facilitated the most severe payday lending
problem in the nation. With only about 2.8 million people, Mississippi is
one of the least populous states, but according to the best data available
from the state of Mississippi, it has 1069 payday lenders. For its
population and number of banks, this easily earns Mississippi the
distinction of having the highest density of payday lending of any state.
If present trends continue, Mississippi will soon be the only American
state to have more payday lenders than banks. Every one of Mississippi's
four U.S. congressional districts ranks among the nation's most saturated
by payday lenders. The dubious distinction of worst in the nation goes to
Bennie Thompson's second district, which has 308 payday lenders to 236
banks, the second most lopsided ratio in the nation.1 79 This is also the
second most payday lenders of any district in the nation, and the second
highest per capita ratio in the country, trailing only the first district of
Representative Wicker's district has 337 payday
Roger Wicker.
lenders-more than any other district in the nation. With 287 banks,
Representative Wicker represents a district with the seventh worst
relative location quotient ranking nationally. Wicker's district also has
the most payday lender locations per capita, giving his district the second
worst composite ranking in the nation for payday lending.'is Hardly any
better off are Gene Taylor's fourth district, which ranks fifth worst
nationally and Chip Pickering's third district, which ranks sixth worst
nationally. '
Most of Mississippi's state legislative districts also have very high
numbers and densities of payday lenders, several of them ranking among
the worst nationally when they are compared to their counterparts
outside Mississippi. Only a few of the highly gerrymandered, mostly
white, safe districts have normal or below average concentrations of
payday lenders. The worst among the upper house districts are Nolan
Mettetal's tenth and Lydia Chassaniol's fourteenth, both rural districts
177. This interest rate figure assumes a fourteen-day loan of $325. The APR figure
was calculated with the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's free APR
calculation software. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 161; see also
Peterson, supra note 121, at 1128-35.
178. See infra app. tbl.1. Our estimate of the number of payday lenders in Mississippi
is derived from licensing information gathered by the Mississippi Department of Banking
and Consumer Finance. This estimate was further verified in a telephone interview with
the Mississippi Banking Commissioner, John S. Allison. Surveys of multiple telephone
directories also support our Mississippi estimate.
179. See infra app. tbl.5.
180. See infra app. tbl.5.
181. See infra app. tbl.5.
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along 1-55 north of Jackson. Merle Flowers' Memphis-area district,
though it has the second highest per capita density of payday lenders
(forty-one for a population of around 54,000) among all upper house
districts, still only manages to rank tenth on our scale, which highlights
the problems other districts have with payday lending."" Among the
districts in the lower chamber, Omeria Scott's eightieth district, which
includes a small Choctaw Indian reservation, is worst, with twenty-six
payday lenders for just over 20,000 people, or about 1.2 payday lenders
per every one thousand persons in the district."' As unbelievable as that
figure is, Ray Rogers' sixty-first district, surrounding Pearl, has thirty
payday lenders for roughly the same population, or 1.23 payday lenders
per one thousand people. Warner McBride's tenth district ranks second
worst statewide and Sid Bondurant's twenty-fourth district is third worst.
About half of all Mississippi counties rank in the top ten percent
nationally for payday lending. Hinds County alone has more payday
lenders than all of Minnesota and is nineteenth worst overall nationally
for payday lending. But, Hinds County is actually only about average in
Mississippi for per capita and commercial payday lending densities. The
highest ratio of payday lenders (fifteen) to banks (six) among
Mississippi's counties is in Attala County, which has the second highest
such ratio nationally. With less than 20,000 people, Attala County also
has the fifth highest per capita ranking nationally and ranks worst
nationally overall when those two statistics are considered together. If
the total number of payday lenders is added to the ranking, then Jones
County is worst nationally for payday lending because its overall ranking
in three categories is lowest. However, when Mississippi's counties are
considered apart from the rest of the U.S., then Panola and Grenada
counties rank worst and second worst overall.
Mississippi's payday lending problem is also evident when viewed
through the lens of ZIP codes-several of which also rank among the
nation's worst. Indeed, the three highest ZIP code rankings in the U.S.
are all found in Mississippi. For example, Batesville ZIP code 38606 has
three times more payday lenders than banks and a very high per capita
density (1.4 per 1000), suggesting it is fairly considered among the
nation's worst. Jackson has several ZIP codes swamped with payday
lenders; worst among them appears to be 39204, which is the second
worst in the nation with nineteen payday lenders and only three banks.
But, the place with the worst payday lending problem in the entire
United States appears to be Columbus' 39705 ZIP code. This tract

182. See infra app. tbl.3.
183. See infra app. tbl.4.
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appears to have twelve payday lenders and not a single bank for a
population of nearly 15,000 people.'4
Mississippi's payday lending problem has developed under the watch
of political leaders that aggressively promote biblical values on many
other legal questions. According to our methodology, Mississippi is
second only to Alabama in the political power of conservative Christian
Americans.18 About forty percent of the people in Mississippi are
evangelical Christians, the fifth highest concentration of any state.
Moreover, the Christian political advocacy organizations we surveyed
gave Mississippi's Congressional delegation the eleventh best evaluation
in the country. And, in tune with its constituents on many issues, the
Mississippi congressional delegation ranked fourth on Poole and
Given these Christian
Rosenthal's measure of social conservatism.
credentials, one would expect the leaders of Mississippi to give legal
voice to the biblical injunction against usury. Our results suggest they
have not.
3. Payday Loans in the Mormon West: The Utah Example
Throughout most of the twentieth century, Utah had a general usury
law capping interest rates at a simple nominal annual rate of twelve
percent.'87 Moreover, the state also adopted a small loan law authorizing
licensed lenders to make small consumer loans at up to thirty-six percent
per annum.ln Unlike Alabama and Mississippi, however, Utah retains
no consumer credit price limitation-either in a general usury law, a
small loan law, or in its payday lending authorization legislation.'
Nevertheless, the Utah legislature has passed a payday lending
authorization statute.' 90 This legislation includes a variety of essentially
cosmetic rules that do not meaningfully impede or change payday
lending business practices within the state. Some of the rules simply echo
federal law in force irrespective of the Utah statute.
This legal environment has facilitated the development of a powerful
payday lending industry in both Utah's sparsely populated desert areas
and the rapidly growing capital city. Utah has about 383 payday lenders,
184. See infra app. tbl.2.
185. See infra app. tbl.1.
186. See infra app. tbl.1.
187. See Act of Mar. 14, 1907, ch. 46, § 2, 1907 Utah Laws 43, 43.
188. See Utah Small Loan Act, ch. 15A, § 13(a), 1945 Utah Laws 31, 39 (repealed
1969) (allowing charges up to three percent monthly).
189. The Utah Code merely provides that "the parties to a consumer credit agreement
may contract for payment by the debtor of any finance charge and other charges and
fees." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-2-101 (2001).
190. Check Cashing Registration Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7-23-101 to -110 (2006 &
Supp. 2007).
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which is a large number considering its small population. Per capita,
Utah has the ninth highest density of payday lenders in the nation. Its
payday lender to bank ratio is also far above the national averageeighth highest in the country-giving Utah a composite total rank in the
top ten.' 9' All of Utah's U.S. House districts have above average
densities of payday lenders, the worst of the three being Rob Bishop's
first district, which ranks forty-fifth out of 435 House districts for overall
payday lending activity.
Measuring payday lending through the lens of state legislative districts
also suggests a large payday lending industry given Utah's population.
Following this population, most of the state's payday lenders can be
found in the urban and suburban Interstate 15 corridor between Ogden
and Provo. Among state senate districts, the largest absolute number of
payday lenders is in Gene Davis' Salt Lake City-area third district, but
the highest densities controlling for population and commercial activity
are just south of Hill Air Force Base in Sheldon Killpack's twenty-first
district and just north of the base in Scott Jenkin's twentieth district.
Among the lower house districts, Oda Curtis' fourteenth district, which
also borders Hill Air Force Base, may be worst, with fifteen payday
lenders and only six banks for its approximately 34,000 citizens -roughly
one payday lender for every 5,000 citizens. The other district with similar
levels of payday lending is Mark Wheatley's thirty-fifth district in the
South Salt Lake City area.' 92
Utah's payday lending problem is perhaps even more apparent at the
county and ZIP code level. By way of comparison, Salt Lake County has
more than twice the number of payday lenders than the entire state of
Minnesota. Yet, about ten Utah counties are worse than Salt Lake
County overall for payday lending when controlling for their population
and commercial activity. Topping the list are Tooele and Uintah
Counties, which both have more payday lenders than banks and high per
capita densities. Weber County ranks a strong third in this dubious
category. In terms of ZIP codes, Ogden's 84405 and Layton's 84041 ZIP
codes are tied for second worst in Utah for payday lending, again
possibly owing to their close proximity to Hill Air Force Base. Other
ZIP codes with especially high densities of payday lenders are found in
the Salt Lake suburbs of West Valley (84119) and Kearns (84118). The
suburb of South Salt Lake City has the sad distinction of hosting the ZIP
code (84115) with the worst payday lending problem in a state replete
with payday lenders.

191.
192.

See infra app. tNl.
See infra app. tbl.4.

2008]

Usury Law and the Christian Right

Utah's payday lending saturation is both puzzling and ironic given its
large majority of Mormons and history of easy integration of religious
doctrine into political life. Utah easily ranks first in percent of
evangelicals and Mormons per one thousand persons, with Mormons
comprising nearly two-thirds of its population.'93 Although the Christian
political organizations scoring politicians may vary greatly with Mormons
on theological issues, they approve of Mormon politicians, ranking them
sixth nationally, which is higher than the score given to any delegation
from any state in old Dixie. The Poole and Rosenthal data suggest that
Utah's delegation is not quite as conservative as the former measure, but
they nevertheless show the delegation on the conservative side, ranking it
14
nineteenth. Overall, Utah ranks fifth in our Christian Power Index.'
Given these political facts, the state would seem to be the ideal candidate
for an outright ban on payday lending and other usurious lending
practices. Like many other Americans, Mormons unequivocally embrace
the Bible,'95 and presumably its blistering condemnation of usury. It is
true Mormons also embrace some of their own additional scriptural
works, but these scriptures do not contradict biblical teachings on
usury.' 96 In fact they appear to echo biblical condemnation in passages
suggesting God's "sword of vengeance" awaits those who oppress wage
earners and the poor.' 7 Utah's payday lending infestation is made all the
193. See infra app. tbl.1.
194. See infra app. tbl.1.
195. See The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Gospel Topics: Bible,
Inerrancy of, http://www.lds.org/ldsorg/v/index.jspvgnextoid=bbd508f54922dOlOVgnVC
M1000004d82620aRCRD&locale=O&sourceld=59a22f2324d98010VgnVCM1000004d8262
Oa (last visited Mar. 19, 2008) ("Latter-day Saints revere the Bible. They study it and
believe it to be the word of God. However, they do not believe the Bible, as it is currently
available, is without error.").
196. See BRUCE R. MCCONKIE, MORMON DOCTRINE 819 (2d ed. 1966).
197. See, e.g., THE BOOK OF MORMON 367 (Joseph Smith, Jr. trans., 1920) (1830)
(Helaman 4:11-12) ("[T]he great slaughter which was among them, would not have
happened had it not been for their wickedness and their abomination which was among
them; yea, and it was among those also who professed to belong to the church of God.
And it was because of the pride of their hearts, because of their exceeding riches, yea, it
was because of their oppression to the poor .... ); id. at 446 (3 Nephi 24:5) ("And I will
come near to you to judgment; and I will be a swift witness ... against those that oppress
the hireling in his wages .... saith the Lord of Hosts."); id. at 475 (Mormon 8:37-38, 41)
("For behold, ye do love money, and your substance, and your fine apparel, and the
adorning of your churches, more than ye love the poor and the needy, the sick and the
afflicted. 0 ye pollutions, ye hypocrites, ye teachers, who sell yourselves for that which
will canker, why have ye polluted the holy church of God? Why are ye ashamed to take
upon you the name of Christ? Why do ye not think that greater is the value of an endless
happiness than that misery which never dies-because of the praise of the world? . ..
Behold, the sword of vengeance hangeth over you; and the time soon cometh that he
avengeth the blood of the saints upon you, for he will not suffer their cries any longer.");
see also THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
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more surprising by its generally white, middle class demographic profile,
highly educated population, and reputation for strong family bonds."'
Despite all these factors, Utah retains a payday lending problem more
severe than many Bible Belt states in the Southeast including Arkansas,
Georgia, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.
4. Born Again? The North CarolinaExample
Throughout the twentieth century the North Carolina legislature
retained usury laws limiting prices on consumer loans. For example, the
state's highest price limit in the mid-1960s limited finance charges on a
loan principal comparable to a typical contemporary payday loan to no
more than one dollar per five dollars loaned per year-an interest rate
limit of about twenty percent. 99 But like many other state legislatures in
the 1980s and 1990s, the North Carolina legislature responded to
consumer finance industry pressure by liberalizing its usury limits. In
1997, the North Carolina legislature passed a statute allowing payday
lenders to obtain a license that authorized charging fees of fifteen
percent of the face amount of a check to defer the deposit of the check. °°
In a typical loan with an initial duration of two weeks, this law capped
interest rates at about 360%.0 However, unlike many states, North
Carolina embraced this price limit somewhat more cautiously, treating
the change in its laws as an experiment, rather than a permanent
elimination of consumer protection law. The legislature included a
"sunset" provision in the law, stating that the licensing statute and its
extremely high price
limit would expire four years later, absent a vote to
• • 202
extend its provisions.
(§ 136:8) ("Let each company bear an equal proportion,
according to the dividend of their property, in taking the poor, the widows, the fatherless,
and the families of those who have gone into the army, that the cries of the widow and the
fatherless come not up into the ears of the Lord against this people.").
198. See U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, Utah: 2006 American Community
Survey, http://factfinder.census.govfhome/safflmain.html?-lang=en (select "Utah" from
the dropdown menu under "Get a Fact Sheet for your community") (last visited Mar. 19,
2008); U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, Selected Social Characteristics in the
United States: 2006, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ADPTable?_bm=y&-geo-id=040
00US49&-qr-name=ACS_2006_EST_GOODP2&-gc url=null&-dsname=ACS_2006_ES
T_G00_&-_lang=en&-redoLog=false (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
199. See BARBARA A. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 163
(1965).
200. 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws. 1030 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-281(d)) (expired
LATrER-DAY SAINTS 254 (1949)

2001).
201. This figure was calculated using APRWIN. See Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, supra note 161.
202. 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws. 391, § 3 ("This act becomes effective on October 1, 1997,
and the provisions of G.S. 53-281 shall expire on July 31, 2001."); see also Graves &
Peterson, supra note 98, at 768.
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Despite the uncertain long-term future of their capital investments in
North Carolina, payday lenders flooded the state without hesitation. The
number of payday lending outlets exploded from 307 in 1997, to 1,204 by
the year 2000.03 As the four-year sunset date drew closer, consumer
rights organizations and many officials in the Bank Commissioner's
Office and the legislature grew horrified at both the prices payday
lenders were charging over long durations, as well as the disregard for
many of the modestly protective rules that remained in the licensing
statute.2 The Bank Commissioner's Office found that North Carolina
consumers were purchasing about sixty-three percent of their payday
loans at annual interest rates between 460.08% and 805.15%. 20' Eightyseven percent of borrowers were unable to pay the loans back after the
initial duration, instead rolling over their loans at least one time with any
given lender. 206 Not counting debtors who borrowed from multiple
locations, nearly forty percent of North Carolina borrowers renewed
their payday loans more than ten times.
A study by a consumer
advocacy organization estimated that long-term borrowers fueled the
industry's profits, with eighty-five percent of revenue coming from North
Carolinians who took five or more payday loans per year.2 °8 Moreover,
the Bank Commissioner's Office found an industry-wide culture of
lawlessness wherein regulators found 8911 violations of simple state
consumer protection rules after conducting 713 payday lender
inspections over a three-year period.20 Recognizing the social trauma
these numbers represented, the North Carolina legislature resisted
tremendous industry pressure when it refused to extend the licensing
statute past the four-year sunset date.1
When the North Carolina legislature let its payday lending
authorization legislation expire, the state reverted to its traditional small
loan law, which included a far more modest usury limit of thirty-six
percent
this, continued
payday lenders
refusedtheir
to comply
with
the law per
for year.2
several Despite
years and
to market
triple-digit

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

N.C. OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF BANKS, supra note 20, at 5.
See id. at 1-2.
Id. at 3.
See id. at 6 tbl.III(F).
See id.

PETER SKILLERN, CMTY. REINVESTMENT ASS'N OF N.C., SMALL LOANS, BIG
BUCKS 4 (2002).
209. N.C. OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF BANKS, supra note 20, at 2.

210. Graves & Peterson, supra note 98, at 768.
211. North Carolina Consumer Finance Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-173(a) (2005)
(imposing an interest rate cap of thirty-six percent for loans under six hundred dollars and
a cap of fifteen percent on any amount loaned from six hundred dollars to three thousand
dollars).
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interest rate payday loans throughout the state under a variety of
dubious legal rationales. The state attorney general and the banking
commissioner both began to attempt to force payday lenders to comply
with the law or shut their doors. But by 2005, over six hundred payday
lender locations continued to openly operate in clear violation of the
law.212
Nevertheless, North Carolina's experience demonstrates that while
returning to the traditional American legal environment can be difficult,
it is not impossible. After long efforts, North Carolina's regulatory
authorities have had substantial success in enforcing their reemployed
usury limits. Most notably, in 2006 several of the largest payday lending
chains, including Check Into Cash, Check 'n Go, and Advance America,
entered into consent agreements with state authorities and stopped
making payday loans. 213 The major national chains have all either left
North Carolina altogether, adopted new lending practices to comply with
state law, or limited their business practices to traditional check cashing
without a credit component. 214
Today the government officials have no database or other information
on payday lenders that continue to have a physical presence in the state.
Furthermore, the authors conducted an informal review of telephone
directory listings in the state and could discern no significant brick-andAfter nearly seven years of
mortar payday lending presence. 2 "
212. Graves & Peterson, supra note 98, at 769-70.
213. Press Release, N.C. Dep't of Justice, Payday Lending on the Way Out in N.C.
(Mar. 1, 2006), available at http://www.ncdoj.com/DocumentStreamerClient?directory=
PressReleases/&file=paydaylenders3.06.pdf.
214. See id. ("The agreements [between payday lenders and the state of North
Carolina] mean that payday lending by all major companies in North Carolina has come to
a halt.... Check Into Cash and Check 'n Go plan to leave the state, while First American
[Cash Advance] plans to try to get licensed as a consumer finance lender and would have
to abide by state laws that limit interest rates on small loans."); see also Ben Werner,
Payday Lender Closing 103 U.S. Branches, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Sept. 21, 2007
(noting that Advance America vacated North Carolina completely); infra note 215 (noting
that some establishments still operate to cash checks without extending credit).
215. Some business chains, such as ACE Cash Express, still operate store locations in
North Carolina. However, the authors' calls to store outlets within the state indicate that
these locations merely cash checks without offering credit by agreeing to hold the checks
for the duration of a loan. In a few locations we did find telephone directory listings
purporting to offer payday loans, but all of the listed telephone numbers are now
disconnected. North Carolina, like other states, still has a significant problem of payday
lenders operating through the Internet. See generally JEAN ANN Fox & ANNA PETRINI,
CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., INTERNET PAYDAY LENDING 5 (2005), available at http://

("Internet
payday
www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/InternetPayday-Lendingll3004.PDF
lending is the latest ploy used by small loan companies to evade consumer protections and
usury laws in the state where borrowers apply for and receive loans and few state
regulators have attempted to enforce state credit laws against online lenders."); see also id.
at 10 ("Non-bank internet lenders would be subject to state law in North Carolina.").
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aggressive enforcement efforts-following the legislature's four-year
experiment-North Carolina once again appears to be largely free of
payday lending operations.
For purposes of this study, North Carolina also provides an important
counterpoint to the claim that the density of payday lender locations
correlates with the political power of conservative Christian Americans.
North Carolina, like many states in the Southeast, has solid Christian
credentials. Twenty-six percent of North Carolinians are evangelical or
Mormon. 6 The conservative Christian advocacy groups gave the North
Carolina delegation respectable scores, placing the state twenty-eighth
out of fifty. And North Carolina's Congressional delegation ranks
thirteenth on Poole and Rosenthal's measure of social conservatism.
Together, these three factors made North Carolina seventeenth in our
Christian Power Index. While this places North Carolina behind many of
the other more traditional Bible Belt states, the state's population and
leaders are clearly more in tune with conservative notions of biblical
values than most of the country. North Carolina, along with Georgia
(tenth in our CPI ranking) and West Virginia (twenty-third in our CPI
ranking), should stand as legislative and regulatory models for other
conservative Christian states wishing to reimpose traditional biblical
values in their consumer financial services markets.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Politicsof Usury in Conservative Christian States
As we emphasized in Part III, this Article does not provide a causal
explanation of the correlation between our payday lending density index
and our Christian Power Index. For example, our research does not
attempt to explain why-despite comparable legal environments-some
states, such as Minnesota and New Hampshire, have fewer payday
lenders relative to population and commercial activity than states such as
Mississippi, Alabama, and Utah. We have refrained from attempting
such an analysis for two reasons: first, because of the formidable
methodological challenges posed by such an explanation; and second,
because we are reluctant to enter into a potentially controversial, and
perhaps even painful, debate about culture and faith that such a causal
explanation might invite.
Our data merely report a simple-but
nonetheless important-geographic fact: there tend to be more payday
lender locations in areas where conservative Christians live and control
government. We leave it to others to explain why this relationship exists.
216. See The Association of Religion Data Archives, State Membership Report, North
Carolina, http://www.thearda.com/mapsReports/reports/state/37-2000.asp
(last visited
Mar. 19, 2008).
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Table 2. Maximum Annual Percentage Rates of Top Fifteen Conservative Christian
States' Usury Limits on Typical Payday Loans, 2007
APR of 2007 Usury Limit
State
2007
on a Typical Payday Loan...
CPI Rank
456.29%
Alabama
1
572.29%
2
Mississippi
No limit
Idaho
3
460.06%
Kentucky
4
No limit
Utah
5
240.66%
Tennessee
6
381.04%
Oklahoma
7
521.43%
8
Wyoming
432.38%
Arkansas
8
219.40%
Georgia
10
391.07%
Kansas
11
360.99%
Louisiana
11
1955.36%
13
Missouri
460.04%
S. Carolina
14
460.06%
15
Nebraska
Typical payday loan defined as a $325 loan of
fourteen-day duration.

Nevertheless, we believe one causal observation is plain from our data.
Irrespective of the religious tendencies, it is clear that states that
continue to impose and aggressively enforce traditional American usury
laws do not have significant payday lending industries. Thus, one
necessary but insufficient causal explanation of the correlation between
payday lender density and conservative Christian political power is legal:
most conservative Christian states have abandoned their traditional
usury limits. Indeed, of the fifteen states ranking highest on our measure
of conservative Christian political power, fourteen have legislation
explicitly authorizing payday lending. As Table 2 shows, two of these
states have no usury limit whatsoever 2 8 and eleven of the remaining
thirteen have crafted arguably misleading statutes that authorize interest
rates of over 350%.219 Only Georgia has attempted to forbid payday
lending with a usury limit that, although generous by historical standards,
is generally recognized as below the threshold necessary to facilitate the
payday lending business model.220
217. Peterson, supra note 121, at app. tbl.6.
218. These states are Idaho and Utah.
219. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Wyoming.
220. E.g., Aimee A. Minnich, Comment, Rational Regulation of Payday Lending, 16
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 84, 99 (2006) ("The Georgia legislature recently enacted
legislation that so restricts payday lending as to effectively ban the practice." (citing GA.
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Going beyond this legal reality, a deeper question remains: why have
so many socially conservative, Christian states come to abandon their
traditional response to usury? After all, in past generations, socially
conservative Christian Americans have not always, and indeed have
rarely, allied themselves with powerful corporate and financial interests.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, born-again Christians and
evangelicals tended to be at the forefront of a variety of campaigns to
ameliorate the living, working, and financial conditions of the poor.22 '
For example, evangelicals supported the prohibition of child labor and
promoted universal education 2 Many evangelicals have traditionally
seen great peril to one's salvation in excess prosperity, and have
At the
approached wealthy financiers with profound skepticism.
beginning of the twentieth century, conservative Christian Americans
repeatedly declared that "love of money was the root of all evil," and
bemoaned what they saw as the growing materialism and consumerism of
American society.22

This skepticism of those who too aggressively seek riches for
themselves generated universal support of usury law in conservative
Christian states. Beginning in the colonial period and continuing through
the early and mid-twentieth century, legislatures in Bible Belt states
rigorously condemned and prohibited usury. At the founding of the
American republic in 1776, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Virginia all joined their northern counterparts in limiting simple
At the
rates to between
fivethe
andstill
eight
percent.225
nominal
annual
interestcentury,
unsettled
turn of the
twentieth
except for
relatively

CODE. ANN. § 16-17-1(a) (2003 & Supp. 2005))). The interest rate limit listed for
Tennessee in Table 2 is likely an overly conservative estimate. Tennessee has a payday
lending authorization statute that caps prices at "the lesser of: (1) Fifteen percent (15%)
of the face amount of the check; or (2) Thirty dollars ($30.00). The fee, when made and
collected, shall not be deemed interest for any purpose of law." TENN. CODE ANN. § 4517-112(b) (2007). Because the annual percentage rates in Table 2 assume a loan of $325,
Tennessee's maximum finance charge of $30 is relatively low in comparison to other states
where payday lending is legal. We anticipate that, as a result, payday lenders in Tennessee
tend to make loans with smaller dollar amounts (perhaps making multiple loans to one
customer) in order to preserve their high margins. The idiosyncratic result is that, despite
comparable APRs listed in Table 2, Georgia's legislation is much more consumer friendly
than Tennessee's.
221. STEVE BRUCE, CONSERVATIVE PROTESTANT POLITICS 145 (1998).
222. Id.
223. Gary Scott Smith, Evangelicals Confront Corporate Capitalism: Advertising,
Consumerism, Stewardship, and Spirituality, 1880-1930, in MORE MONEY, MORE
MINISTRY 39, 62-63 (Larry Eskridge & Mark A. Noll eds., 2000).
224. Id. at 62.
225. Peterson, supra note 121, at 1118 & tbl.1.
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226

Florida, every state in the Old South had a usury law. By 1965, every
state on our list of the current most conservative Christian states, as well
as every state in the Old South, had a traditional usury limit. 227 Almost
all of these states limited credit interest rates to between thirty and fortytwo percent. 228 The average interest rate limit on a short-term consumer
loan with a balance and initial duration comparable to today's payday
loans was thirty-six percent. 221
Starting in the 1980s, but more fully coming to fruition during the first
term of George W. Bush, socially conservative Christians formed an
alliance with powerful business interests. 230 One of the key outcomes of
the "Reagan Revolution" of the 1980s was the cementing of a powerful
political marriage between business-minded, economic liberals and social
conservatives within the Republican Party. l For generations following
the Civil War, southern evangelical Christians, presumably still
embittered by the Republican legacy created during Reconstruction,
staunchly supported the Democratic Party. Similarly, populists in the
Democratic Party appealed to the biblically-inspired notions of charity
faithfully adhered to by millions of socially conservative "Dixicrats."
But, the Democratic Party also included a host of other interest groups,
including a variety of secular social progressives. While there was much
common ground between socially conservative Christians and
progressives on economic policy issues, such as usury law, the centurylong alliance was unable to withstand the tension created by issues like
civil rights, abortion, prayer in school, and gun control. Ronald Reagan,
and later George W. Bush, was able to capitalize on the disaffected social
conservatives who felt the Democratic Party had become too liberal on
many social issues. The Republican Party welcomed the enormous
number of politically-energized conservative Christians and their favored
candidates, many of whom won election contests all the way from local
226. See id. at 1119 ("Th[e] deep American skepticism of consumer lending
entrenched a legal commitment to limited interest rates that continued largely unabated
through the end of the nineteenth century.").
227. Id. at 1138.
228. See id. at app. tbl.A.
229. Id. at 1139-40 & fig.1.
230. See John Kincaid, Foreword: The New Federalism Context of the New Judicial
Federalism, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 913, 924-25 (1995) (noting that "[w]ith the election of
Ronald Reagan in 1980 ...social conservatives glimpsed their first opportunity to wield
federal power on behalf of their policy preferences" and listing a number of President
Reagan's reforms supporting various business interests).
231. Cf.James W. Lamare, Jerry L. Polinard & Robert D. Wrinkle, Texas: Religion
and Politics in God's Country, in THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 59, 63
(John C. Green, Mark J. Rozell & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2003) (discussing the influence of
the Moral Majority and the Religious Roundtable in Texas politics and noting that the
Roundtable "pledged its support to the Reagan candidacy").
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school boards to the halls of the U.S. Senate." 2 Biblical values were used
unabashedly to forward legislation on a host of cultural issues, especially
abortion, prayer in schools, capital punishment, and gay rights. 3'
However, the relatively new alliance between business-minded corporate
capitalists and social-values conservatives profoundly muted biblical
values that had been historically used by Christian legislators to justify
standards of basic commercial decency. The result of this alliance has
been a purging of biblical values from the economic policy realm in many
otherwise conservative Christian states. Ironically, a fundamentally
liberal moral relativism with respect to consumer finance has supplanted
traditional Christian condemnation of the sin of usury. In turn, this
facilitated the indebtedness, apparently at virtually any price, of millions
of low- and middle-income Americans.
B. Biblical Values and the Economics of Usury Law

Payday lenders and their apologists argue that payday loans merely
respond to legitimate economic demand. They contend that repeated
borrowing is evidence of customer satisfaction and of the social utility of
salary loan products. In this view, payday loans have higher prices
because of high default rates as well as the high costs of originating and
servicing payday debts. As discussed above, these arguments are all
foreshadowed in Jeremy Bentham's classic treatise Defense of Usury and
have been the subject of hot dispute amongst academics for hundreds of
years. 234 Today, more judges, legislators, regulators, professors, and
businesspersons harbor suspicion of usury laws based on these
economically-inspired arguments than at any other time in American
history. Ultimately, however, engaging in this economic debate is
beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, it would seem that the task for conservative Christians
and their leaders is to choose between these arguments and the Bible's
apparent rejection of them.235 For those Christians to whom the Bible's
indictment of usurious lending is by itself insufficient, many of the
economists, philosophers, and leaders who paved the way for the
American republic and its economic system may supply further
compelling justification.
For example, Western civilization's most
232. Center for Religion, Ethics, and Social Policy, Cornell University, The Rise of the
Religious Right in the Republican Party, http://www.theocracywatch.org/introduction2.
htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2008) ("In the 1980 elections, the newly politicized Religious
Right succeeded in unseating five of the most liberal Democrat incumbents in the U.S.
Senate, and provided the margin that helped Ronald Reagan defeat Jimmy Carter.").
233. Cf Lamare, Polinard & Wrinkle, supra note 231, at 72-73.
234. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
235. See Matthew 16:6 ("[B]eware of the leaven of the Pharisees ... .
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venerated economist, Adam Smith, recognized the need for laws placing
236
a reasonable ceiling on credit pricing. While he rejected the medieval
prohibition of all interest, Smith recognized that the market for loans
could never be expected to perform efficiently so long as "prodigals and
projectors" could be enticed into loans contrary to their own best
interest.' 3' Human nature being what it is, Smith argued usury limits
"ought always to be somewhat above the lowest market price, or the
price which is commonly paid for the use of money by those who can give
the most undoubted security." 238 Surely Christians need not apologize
for biblical economics when Adam Smith himself shared the same view.
Moreover, characterizing usury law as a constraint on freedom overlooks
the fact that predatory lending itself is a form of tyranny. In the words of
John Locke, "ill deserves the name of confinement [that] which hedges
us in only from bogs and precipices.""' Usury law hedges in families
from bogs of inescapable 450% interest rate loans-thus, meaningfully
preserving their ability to pursue life, liberty, and property.
On this point, America's Founding Fathers found no difficulty in
reconciling the biblical injunction against usury with their commitment to
political and economic freedom because they recognized that usurious
loans too easily become traps that ensnare our neighbors, children,
siblings, and240 friends. If Proverbs is correct that the borrower is a slave to
the lender, then a free people ought to have no qualms about using the
rule of law to prevent themselves and their fellow citizens from falling
into indenture. This is why Benjamin Franklin exhorted his fellow
236.
(1767).
237.

2 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 43 (Am. Dome Library Co. 1902)
Id. at 44. But see Joseph M. Jadlow, Adam Smith on Usury Laws, 32 J. FIN. 1195,

1199-1200 (1977) (critically dismissing Smith's view of usury ceilings). Smith's mention of
prodigals and projectors perhaps seems more portentous today than in 1977. Presumably
it would be precisely these individuals who are most likely to suffer from imperfect
heuristics and bounded rationality, as demonstrated by a host of behavioral economists in
recent years. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 31, at 748-54, 766-72.
238. 2 SMITH, supra note 236, at 43.
239. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 123 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003)
(1690). Locke continued:
[T]he end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge
freedom: for in all the states of created beings capable of laws, "where there is no
law, there is no freedom;" for liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from
others; which cannot be where there is not law: but freedom is not, as we are told,
"a liberty for every man to do what he lists:" (for who could be free, when every
other man's humour might domineer over him?) but a liberty to dispose and
order as he lists his person, actions, possessions, and his whole property, within
the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be subject to the
arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.
Id. at 123-24.
240.

Proverbs 22:7.
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Americans to "disdain the chain, preserve your freedom; and maintain
your independency: be industrious and free; be frugal and free.''24' The
notion of freedom as an organizing social and economic principal does
not compel a community of citizens to ignore the tyranny of usurers any
more than it does that of murders, thieves, or opium traders.
242
In
It is true that the Bible instructs borrowers to repay their debts.
the view of most conservative Christian Americans, sound financial
stewardship is a personal responsibility borne by every adult individual.
Nevertheless, one would hope a debtor's weakness does not excuse a
usurer's sin. Moreover, neither debtor weakness nor usurer avarice
obviate the responsibility of community leaders to use law in the service
of a just, humane, and well-ordered society. For those who do believe
the Bible condemns usury, the empirical findings of this Article should
serve as a wakeup call highlighting the unprecedented practice and
acceptance of usurious lending throughout most of the United States.
V. CONCLUSION

This Article presents an empirical analysis of the correlation between
payday lender locations and the political power of conservative Christian
Americans. This study compiled an original nationwide database of
payday lender locations-the most comprehensive catalogue of its kind
yet created. Moreover, this study proposes a new index measuring
political power of conservative Christians Americans. This analysis
suggests that with over 24,000 payday lender locations nationwide, the
payday lending industry has now fundamentally transformed the
financial services sector catering to lower-income Americans. Our
findings should serve as conclusive proof that conservative Christian
Americans are a prime demographic target of the payday lending
industry. The elimination of traditional state usury law has facilitated
nationwide growth of an industry of lenders charging average simple
annual interest rates of over 450%. Rather than bastions of Christian
charity, many conservative Christian states have become legal safe
havens for money changers who aggressively market usury to America's
poor.

241. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE WAY TO WEALTH (1757), reprinted in 1 THE
NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 442, 447 (Nina Baym et al. eds., 4th
ed. 1994) (emphasis added).
242. See Psalms 37:21.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Payday Lending Activity and ChristianPower Index Rankings for States with
Legalized Payday Lending, 2007
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Table 2. Top Thirty ZIP Codes in the United States for Payday Lenders, 2007
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Table 3. Top Thirty State Upper House Legislative Districtsfor Payday Lenders in the
United States, 2007
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Table 4. Top Thirty State Lower House Districtfor Payday Lenders in the United
States, 2007
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Lois M. DeBerry

D

56402

28

4.96

Curtis Oda

R

29701

15

5.05

Owen Drake

R

40609

20

4.93

Jeffrey C. Smith

D

24481

14

5.72

Art Noonan

D

8698

7

8.05

Edward Blackmon, Jr.

D

22239

12

5.40

Alyce Griffin Clarke

D

22461

12

5.34

Kenneth A. Bingham

R

32668

23

7.04

Mark A. Wheatley

D

30138

16

5.31

Patricia Lundstrom

D

26757

14

5.23

-
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Table5. Top 30 U.S. House of Representative Districtsfor Payday Lenders, 2007
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Representative

Bennie Thompson
Travis Childers
John Spratt
Artur Davis
Gene Taylor
Chip Pickering
Steve Cohen
Ed Pastor
Jo Ann Emerson
Jim Clyburn
Terry Everett
Mike D. Rogers
J. Gresham Barrett
John S. Tanner
Bob Inglis
Ed Perlmutter
Lincoln Davis
Robert Cramer
Shelley Berkley
Emanuel Cleaver
Rodney Alexander
Jim McCrery
Jo Bonner
Charlie Melancon
Robert C. Scott
Robert Aderholt
Raul Grijalva
ZachWamp
Roy Blunt
Al Green

MS
MS
SC
AL
MS
MS
TN
AZ
MO
SC
AL
AL
SC
TN
SC
CO
TN
AL
NV
MO
LA
LA
AL
LA
VA
AL
AZ
TN
MO
TX

2
1
5
7
4
3
9
4
8
6
2
3
3
8
4
7
4
5
1
5
5
4
1
3
3
4
7
3
7
9

D
R
D
D
D
R
D
D
R
D
R
R
R
D
R
D
D
D
D
D
R
R
R
D
D
R
D
R
R
D

308
337
209
202
284
286
182
173
265
192
205
172
190
204
201
157
191
175
155
155
185
167
169
167
130
171
100
159
196
100

236
287
161
157
257
294
151
84
289
187
221
177
207
250
236
157
230
200
153
176
247
202
218
213
140
235
94
218
311
99

4.33
4.74
3.13
3.18
3.99
4.02
2.88
2.70
4.26
2.87
3.23
2.71
2.84
3.23
3.01
2.56
3.02
2.75
2.33
2.49
2.90
2.62
2.66
2.62
2.02
2.69
1.56
2.52
3.15
1.53

2
7
3
5
9
16
6
1
24
12
21
17
23
34
29
15
32
26
13
25
41
33
39
37
20
50
10
48
67
14

2
1
6
9
4
3
16
19
5
12
7
20
14
8
10
27
13
18
29
29
15
23
22
23
47
21
67
26
11
67

2
1
10
8
5
4
14
19
3
15
7
18
16
6
12
26
11
17
33
28
13
25
21
24
44
20
64
27
9
70

1
2
3
3
5
6
6
6
9
9
11
12
13
14
15
15
17
17
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

